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FEATURED IN THIS ISSUE:

Administrative Rationality, by John M. Pfiffner

The Mind of the Career Man, by Fritz Morstein Marx

Management in the USSR, by Marshall E. Dimock

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in this number

Henry J. Abraham is completing a year as Fulbright lecturer at the University of Aarhus, Denmark. He has taught political science at the University of Pennsylvania since 1949, winning a \$1,000 award for "excellence in undergraduate teaching" last year. He has published four books, including *Courts and Judges: Introduction to the Judicial Process* and *Government as Entrepreneur and Social Servant*, and over a dozen journal articles.

Erwin W. Bard, professor of political science at Brooklyn College since 1937, has lectured at the College of Europe in Bruges and was a military government official in Europe from 1943-48. He is the author of *The Port of New York Authority*.

Karl A. Bosworth has been on the staff of the Illinois and Kansas legislative councils, was a consultant on the Connecticut budget and a survey unit director for the Connecticut Commission on State Government Organization, and wrote "Law-making in State Governments" for the American Assembly publication, *The Forty-Eight States: Their Tasks as Policy Makers and Administrators*. He teaches public administration at the University of Connecticut.

Marshall E. Dimock helped to launch the visit of the Executive Committee of the Governors' Conference to the Soviet Union last year and accompanied the group to five of the Soviet republics, talking with officials at all levels of government in a 10,000 mile tour. He is head of the All-University Department of Government, New York University, currently on leave to write a book on political economy and public policy, sponsored by three foundations.

Herbert Jacob has joined the faculty of Tulane University after receiving his Ph.D. at Yale. He is working on a monograph on German field administration and will soon begin a study applying Herbert Simon's concepts to local political organizations.

Fritz Morstein Marx this fall becomes professor of political science and dean of administration at Hunter College. He just completed a year as Ford Foundation Research Professor in Governmental Affairs, Princeton University, on leave from the U. S. Budget Bureau, which he had served since 1943. He also teaches regularly at American University and was a visiting professor at the University of Southern California during the summer of 1959. He is author of *The Administrative State* and editor of *Elements of Administration*.

Marvin Murphy has been budget adviser to the Vietnam government for four years as part of the Michigan State University Group there. He was a senior budget examiner for Michigan state government and earlier was a procedures analyst in the Michigan Highway Department. A different look at Vietnam's budget reform by Mr. Murphy will appear soon in the *International Review of Administrative Sciences*.

John M. Pfäfer has taught public administration at the University of Southern California for thirty-one years. He has published two books this year, the fourth edition of his text (with Robert Presthus), *Public Administration*, and *Administrative Organization* (with Frank Sherwood). He is a recipient of the ASPA Los Angeles chapter's Dykstra award. His last contribution to the *Review* was "Policy Leadership—For What?" in Spring, 1959.

John Thurston is staff assistant to the deputy administrator for production adjustment, Commodity Stabilization Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, concerned primarily with management and training in the Service's state and county offices. He is the author of *Government Proprietary Corporations in the English-Speaking Countries*.

Edwin W. Webber is assistant professor of government, William and Mary College, and formerly taught at St. Lawrence University. He is completing his work for a Ph.D. from Tulane University.

Administrative Rationality

By JOHN M. PFIFFNER

*School of Public Administration
University of Southern California*

MR. NICHOLAS NICOLAIDIS, in an empirical study of administration, has analyzed some 332 actual administrative decisions in an attempt to probe the nature of policy and the process of decision-making.¹ This research was carried on under my direction as a project for thirty advanced graduate students who gathered the decisions and discussed them in class.

I originally embarked on this research because of what seemed to be the paucity of empirical studies in the area of decision-making. I was impressed with Simon's theme that the decision was the proper unit for organization analysis, but the literature seemed to consist almost entirely of theory unsupported by data. Now this is not a bad thing in itself; the great discoveries in physics have been based upon theoretical constructs formulated prior to empirical testing. Nevertheless, progress in biology has proceeded in a different way, by decades of description of biological phenomena. Darwin's theoretical constructs were based almost entirely on such descriptive studies. While not wishing to compare ourselves with such a giant, we nevertheless felt that there was great need for descriptive studies of what actually takes place in the administrative world.²

¹ Nicholas G. Nicolaidis, *Policy-Decision and Organization Theory* (University of Southern California Bookstore, John W. Donner Memorial Fund, Publication No. 11, 1960).

² Present examples of such descriptive studies of the decision process are: Herbert A. Simon, et al., *Centralization vs. Decentralization in Organizing the Controller's Department* (Controllershship Foundation, 1954); William J. Gore, "Administrative Decision-Making in Federal Offices," 16 *Public Administration Review* 281-291 (Autumn, 1956).

► If the scientist or engineer finds administrators irrational, it is only because administrators consider many more relevant elements when they make decisions than he does, a study of 332 decisions in the Los Angeles area reveals. The study uncovers the bases of information and rationality used in administrative policy-making, clarifying the process over which the administrator presides (he does not make all the decisions, he often merely presides over the process) and perhaps helping him adjust the "mix" of his rationality to the most successful and ethical.

Nicolaidis' study is descriptive and analytical. The cases attempted to report the decision process in the form of brief prose descriptions, which Nicolaidis then analyzed.³ While his

³ An example of one of the briefer cases and the form used follows:

"1. A metropolitan law enforcement agency's training academy instituted a 'stress training program' designed to eliminate approximately 40 per cent of the recruits. As a part of a functional consolidation program, this large agency invited smaller local police departments to send their officers to the eight-week sessions. It soon became apparent that the officers sent by the smaller police departments were of lower calibre than the recruits of the large agency. The lieutenant in command of the academy was faced with the problem that would result from the application of uniform standards to both groups. If he decided to apply the standards in a uniform manner, all of the local officers would be dismissed along with the other incompetent recruits weeded out by the stress training. This would cause extreme embarrassment to the chief of the larger agency, as the local officers were attending at his personal invitation. Such a decision might also cause a great deal of resentment on the part of the smaller agencies and a breach in cooperation.

"If the lieutenant had decided to apply a double set of standards and permit the local officers to graduate he would have damaged the 'esprit de corps,' which the stress training was intended to establish among the regular recruits. Such a decision would have also adversely affected the morale of the staff at the academy.

"The lieutenant decided to apply a double set of

interpretations were necessarily personal in some respects, he did follow one important aspect of the scientific method. His data are preserved and can be checked by subsequent investigators.⁴ Furthermore, each of his interpretative statements is supported by footnote citations to the cases which seem pertinent.

The Question of Rationality

The Nicolaidis interpretations, overwhelmingly supported by the data, reveal that the processes of administrative decision-making do not conform to orthodox concepts of rationality. For our purposes the orthodox concepts of rationality conform to those usually attributed to economic man, the scientific method, and engineering man. Rational decision-making is thought of as the gathering of all pertinent facts, canvassing the alternatives for action, and selecting the one which will produce maximum results through a thought

standards and permit all local officers to complete the course while eliminating about 40 per cent of the recruits. The lieutenant implemented this decision at a meeting of his training staff by explaining that while the decision would not benefit the department directly, it would have a long-term favorable effect in that the local officers would receive the training; and cooperation between the local agencies and the large agency would not be impaired.

"2. Middle Management was the hierarchical level involved in the decision. The lieutenant commands several sergeants and his supervisor is a captain.

"3. The policy was to accept local officers for training. No policy existed on their retention. The decision made by the lieutenant was to implement major organizational policy.

"4. This was not the proper place in the hierarchy for the decision to be made. The decision should have been a part of the original decision made by the organization.

"5. The decision had a secondary favorable effect. Its primary effect was not favorable."

The methodology of case gathering and analysis is discussed at some length in the above study and in Nicholas Nicolaidis "The Case Method as a Research Tool in Administrative Theory" in Frank P. Sherwood and William B. Storm (eds.) *Teaching and Research in Public Administration: Essays on the Case Approach* (University of Southern California Bookstore, John W. Donner Memorial Fund, Publication No. 16, 1960) pp. 61-85. One hundred cases, digested among the 332, have been published in a separate volume by Beatrice G. Markey and Nicholas G. Nicolaidis (eds.) *Selected Policy-Decision Cases* (University of Southern California Bookstore, John W. Donner Memorial Fund, Publication No. 10, 1960).

⁴The 332 unpublished cases will be filed at USC in the Pakistan Project office.

process which physiology associates with the cerebrum, thus excluding the emotions and the subconscious. It is seen as a coldly calculating process which excludes human sympathy and sentiment.⁵

This latter point lays the groundwork for our principal thesis, that administrative rationality differs from orthodox concepts of rationality because it does take into account an additional spectrum of facts. These are the facts relative to emotions, politics, power, group dynamics, personality and mental health. In other words, the data of social science are facts just as much as the carbon content of steel or the dollars and cents in the salary fund. The administrator is forced by environment to take social science data into account in making his decisions. Thus it may seem economically irrational to get rid of a troublesome school principal by "kicking her upstairs" to an assistant superintendency, but it proved to be quite rational from an administrative standpoint.⁶

Nicolaidis' findings are not entirely novel. They tend to confirm Simon's concept of the administrator as a "satisficer," that is, one who seeks a satisfactory decision rather than an optimum one.⁷ Nicolaidis was in the midst of his content analysis when Lindblom's famous "muddling through" article was published.⁸ Its argument constitutes a fitting introduction to the Nicolaidis findings, which were similar in content and import but arrived at separately. It is with some temerity that one attempts to epitomize Lindblom's principal points, but in essence he maintains that administrative problem-solving differs considerably from the comprehensive-rational procedure described or implied in most discussions of the problem. The latter involves a separation of means and ends, a gathering of all possible data, a careful weighing of alternative solutions, and the choice of the best possible solution (maximization). Lindblom insists that this ideal does not and cannot conform to administrative reality.

⁵See the chapter entitled "Cognitive Limits on Rationality" in James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (John Wiley & Sons, 1958), p. 137.

⁶Actual case in our ongoing study of delegation.

⁷Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (The Macmillan Co., 1957), p. xxv.

⁸Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through,'" 19 *Public Administration Review* 79-88 (Spring, 1959).

He avers that facts and values are so intermingled that it is impossible to separate them and that agreement on political objectives generally cannot be reached; hence, administrative decision-making is ordinarily not preceded by the establishment of clear-cut goals. Furthermore, the limited capacity of the human brain, the pressures of time, the defects of communication systems, and the confusion of fact and value prevent the administrator from canvassing all of the facts and listing a universe of alternatives. What happens instead is decision by means of "successive limited comparisons" in which choices are made from among a narrow selection of alternatives based upon "marginal" values. It is claimed that the maximization contemplated in the comprehensive-rational approach is possible in only a limited range of low order problems such as assembly line scheduling, a major point of attention for operations research. The higher level the problem, the less applicable is the comprehensive-rational method.

Nicolaidis' cases and analysis also conform to an unpublished report of a similar study conducted by William J. Gore and reported orally at the Los Angeles meeting of the American Society for Public Administration in April, 1960. This may be another example of simultaneous discovery by widely separated investigators, such as the Wallace-Darwin⁸ affair, or the simultaneous rediscovery by three people of the Mendel papers on genetics a half century after their publication. It would seem that often when accumulated knowledge has built up to a certain point its import may be discovered and announced at the same time by persons who have worked independently of each other.

Nicolaidis on Policy

Nicolaidis first addressed himself to the nature of policy. He analyzed the 332 cases to ascertain whether there was any uniformity in the decision-maker's concept of policy. He found eleven different ways of looking at it and developed a simple composite definition: policy (in essence) is a rule of action intended to provide relative stability, consistency, uniformity, and continuity in the operations of an organization. But then he proceeded to

warn us against the dangers of oversimplification, because policy takes many different forms and is multi-dimensional and pluralistic in its manifestations.

He then grouped policies into six workable categories. First, a policy may be a norm for action.¹⁰ Second, it may be a control device to keep the members of the organization within the limits of the above norms.¹¹ Third, it may be a simplified method of doing a job.¹² Fourth, it may be a compass for organizational navigation on the dynamic and often confusing sea of administration.¹³ Fifth, it may be a regulating device for a communication system with multifarious conduits and facets.¹⁴ Sixth, it may be an adjusting device between the static and dynamic elements of organization in which the formal and informal elements blend into each other instead of constituting a rigid dichotomy.¹⁵

Policy is at one and the same time both

¹⁰ Mayor's ruling that in budget preparation capital expenses for improvements and betterments be held down (case #17), or a refuse collector's ruling that large cloth containers will not be collected because they are not "suitable ones" according to a city ordinance (case #48).

¹¹ Mayor's prohibition on department heads' ordering of specific brands of merchandise, limiting open bidding.

¹² The decision of a police chief to simplify the problem of investigating suspicious characters by instructing patrolmen to keep all pedestrians out of the residential sections of the city after dark. All legitimate residents used automobile transportation (case #56).

¹³ In a rocket manufacturing company each supervisor selected his own field service personnel using his own criteria. This resulted in a heterogeneous set of criteria for an organization that badly needed homogeneous selection standards and customers' service. Uniform standards were laid down for selection (case #270).

¹⁴ City manager's decision that "in the future all department heads and staff members would take their instructions from the Administrative Assistant, and in turn, report to him" (case #7).

¹⁵ In a police department of a small city a welfare fund was established and sustained formally through voluntary donations of citizens and the revenues of an annual ball. Informally, however, "tickets to this dance were sold to all local businessmen and citizens who were contacted by officers in line of duty as well as traffic violators. Each officer was expected to sell a 'quota' of tickets." When the city expanded, the community changed values and some new officers with high professional standards entered the service. These informal practices met resentment and strong opposition. Informal organization was in ferment. A new policy abolished many of the "informal practices" mentioned above (case #220).

⁸ Consult William Irvine, *Apes, Angels, and Victorians* (Meridian Books, 1959).

flexible and stable, dynamic and static. While the myth of norms laid down by the higher echelons should perhaps be preserved, the facts of life indicate that policy is the result of an equilibrium of many forces, the chief of which is the attempt of lower echelons to gain and preserve autonomy. The line of command strives to preserve its status and control but, when it runs into opposition, compromise, truce and negotiation emerge as modifiers. Lower status people often seem to delight in behaving in a fashion varying from the dictates of the "book."

The spirit of *stare decisis* is strong; decision-makers are constantly looking for precedent. Furthermore, policies are sufficiently flexible so that there may not be a single policy but many to fit certain situations, resulting in an inventory from which one may select that which seems to fit at the time.

In summary, policy is a stabilizing force working toward uniformity, stability, and continuity, but it is structured out of rubber rather than steel. From the standpoint of rationality, it has a strong human and social content, and it is based on considerations of power and politics. Its logic is tainted with the illogic of human nature, but the pure reason of traditional rationality is not excluded. Policy has its origins as much in *agreement* as in *command*.

Nicolaidis on Rationality

Nicolaidis then proceeds to discuss the nature of rationality and considers some traditional models: (1) economic man; (2) the "one best way" of scientific management and industrial engineering; and (3) the ideal model of bureaucracy postulated by Max Weber. He points out how the research findings of modern social science have disproved the basic premises of these models.

He then describes the classical concept of rationality as "identical with a universal logic, and as independent of time, place and objectives," seeking through logic the one rational course to known goals. This is contrasted with the ordinary concept of rationality based upon experience, the aggregate knowledge of previous incidents, without any absolute values or ultimate goals. People bring to administrative decision-making their own personal value systems which they inject into the substance of

decision-making while clothing their decisions with the formal logic of "the good of the organization." They clothe the decision with the official mantle of organization logic and respectability while their eyes remain sighted on more personal goals. But this does not lead to chaos because there is a large element of commonality in personal value systems as related to organization goals.

In summary, the processes of administrative decision-making do contain a strong component of reason, but not the single standard of universal reason envisaged by the classical model of rationality.

Nicolaidis criticizes the cybernetics model because it postulates an organization based upon the animal prototype with a single brain and memory. Our research indicates, contrarily, that the organizations dealt with in our cases were pluralistic, their members having multiple loyalties and expectations. Instead of being unitary and monocratic they were, rather, federations of cooperation, co-existing organic units working together for common ends. In modern bureaucratic organization no one person has complete and indisputable authority over all persons and all subjects with which the organization deals.

Hence, decision-making tends to become circular, multi-dimensional and in conformity with the power structure of the organization. The administrative decision-maker tries to please as many persons as possible, including himself, thus adding a strong political tinge to the decision process. But he also *clothes his decisions with reason*. The politics of the situation requires him to abandon a simple "engineering solution," but he saves face by supporting his decision with reasons which possess face validity. Hence it would be wrong to say that administrative decision-making is either nonrational or irrational. If looked at from one standpoint it is even more rational than the classical model because it takes into consideration a greater variety of data. It considers psychological and social data which are virtually ignored in the classical model. This being the case, is the politician less rational than the engineer?

The Decision Process

Nicolaidis then considers what takes place in the case of the strong leader who is unable

to explain how he makes decisions, as was the case with a number of executives surveyed by *Fortune*.¹⁰ Certain qualities of intuition and mystification have been attributed to the charismatic leader, but an analysis of our cases suggests more pedestrian origins for many administrative decisions. Among these are previous experience in similar cases, education and training. Perhaps our single standard of rationality has caused us to group under the umbrella of intuition and mystery those things which we do unconsciously but which may have a logical explanation. As a matter of fact, there exists in practice a continuum of decision-making models varying from classical rationality at one pole to extreme intuition at the other. Any empirically-based model of decision-making must include such a continuum.

Multiple Standards of Validity

Rather than possessing a single standard of validity, an administrative decision may have to meet several norms, of which five are suggested here. First, it must have some degree of conformance with the personal interests, values, and benefits of the decision-maker (or the ratifier of a decision others have formulated). Second, a decision should meet the value yardsticks of his superiors. Third, it should be acceptable to those who are affected as well as those charged with its implementation. Fourth, it should possess "face validity," that is, look reasonable in its context. Fifth, it should contain built-in justification which will furnish an excuse, and possibly an avenue of retreat, in case results are not as anticipated.

A Galaxy of Decision Points

Nicolaidis then proceeds to consider the conventional model of decision-making which consists of several consecutive steps as follows: (1) recognition of the problem; (2) collection of data; (3) classification and analysis; (4) inventory of means; (5) listing of alternatives; (6) evaluation of alternatives; (7) decision; (8) implementation; and (9) follow-up and feedback. He found that in many of our cases the process began with step 6, namely, a proposed solution. Actually the decision-making process is not linear but more circular; it resembles

"the process of fermentation in biochemistry rather than the industrial assembly line," according to Nicolaidis. It is a constellation or galaxy of numerous individual decisions. The sources of some are patently evident, but others are hidden in the inner sanctum of the human psyche. Nicolaidis notes three constant elements in the decision-making process: (1) muddling through, (2) eliminating uncertainty, and (3) clothing with reason.

It should be emphasized again that our cases revealed that decision-making is not a linear process as depicted in the conventional model's nine steps (above). The galaxy concept seems appropriate because the points in the decision network are not consulted in any charted order. Persons representing several of the decision points might consider the matter simultaneously, and they may have taken the initiative to consider the matter rather than receiving it as an assignment. Moreover, at the point of ultimate decision, the decision-maker often is more a ratifier than an order-giver.

And a Galaxy of Information Points

Our cases revealed that administrative decisions are not ordinarily based upon the communication of complete information. The decision-maker ordinarily must depend upon others for his information. It is incomplete and, as far as the decision-maker can know for sure, it may not even be accurate, for there is limited opportunity to verify it. It is often of a complicated nature which makes it subject to more than one interpretation. The result is that the decision-maker usually screens information provided him through a mesh of conflicting considerations, personal investigation, and his professional knowledge and experience.

The effectiveness of communication as related to decision-making is dependent not only on the fullness and accuracy of information but also on the interaction processes in the organization—who gets what information when. In place of the orderly information flow, step by step up the hierarchy, which we generally have accepted as a model, information really follows a grid of communications made up of overlapping, often contradictory and elusive channels, which really are not channels in the formal sense. Messages are

¹⁰ Editors of *Fortune*, *The Executive Life* (Doubleday & Co., 1956). See pages 164-65.

mutual and compensatory, taking on the conformation of a galaxy like the description we have suggested of the decision process as a whole. The cybernetics view that the message constitutes the basic element in organization and the Simon concept that the decision process is the proper analytical unit thus fits. The information system and the decision system are interdependent and both are circular and multi-dimensional.

Decision-makers resort to several rather pragmatic methods when choosing among alternatives. Very common among these is imitation, or reference to what others are doing—perhaps even following a fashion. Decision-makers also cock their ears toward tradition, what has been done before, a practice which furnishes an excuse or scapegoat in case something goes wrong. Experimentation or pilot programs are popular in complex situations. Consultation, in the form of staff work, advice of superiors, and securing acceptance of interested spokesmen for this or a related program, is frequent.

The failure of the administrator to gather all available data and to list every possible alternative is not due only to the mechanical limitations of the human mind, as some members of the classical school of rationality have suggested. It is due rather to the fact that the administrator has learned to be selective and to utilize cumulative knowledge just as the scientist has. This, combined with the realization that there may be more than one satisfactory solution, has led to the utilization of common sense shortcuts. The administrative decision-maker is constantly striving to reduce the number of alternatives, but by means other than the laborious covering of ground already trodden by others.

What Is Administrative Rationality?

Recently a professor of engineering recalled to me the dilemma and often traumatic inner conflict of the engineer injected into political and administrative situations. The professor made much of the point that the engineer is trained to think "logically." I think we understand the meaning which he intended. It is essentially what Nicolaidis refers to as classical means-ends approach to rationality. It is a type of rationality which deals mostly with

the data and phenomena of the physical world and regards man as merely a productive factor responding automatically as engineering logic expects. This is what March and Simon have referred to as the machine model.

The point which we shall make is that this is only one model of rationality, that several others are just as logical, and that the rational administrator must take these other models of rationality into consideration as well as the engineer's and scientist's classical model.¹⁷

We shall postulate three principal models of rationality: (1) the classical model, (2) the normative model, and (3) the behavioral model.

The Classical Model

The classical or conventional model of rationality has been referred to above. It takes a mechanical attitude toward human motivation and regards human behavior as conditioned by considerations of self-interest, mainly financial. Familiar examples are the search for the one best way in scientific management and economic man. It is closely associated with formal logic, pure reason, and scientific method. According to this model, the decision-maker looks at the ends and then considers the means necessary to get there, which accounts for the fact that this type of rationality is frequently referred to as the means-ends approach.

The classical concept of rationality contemplates that human beings will respond to situations in such a manner as to maximize their own self-interests. The rational mode of thought takes place mostly in the cerebrum as contrasted with those parts of the brain which deal with emotions and unconscious memories. Scientists, engineers, accountants, and economists often take a critical view of human behavior because it does not conform to this model of logic and pure reason, and natural scientists tend to take a critical view of the social sciences for the same reason (perhaps among others).

The Normative Model

The normative model differs from the classical in that it deals with "oughts," or what

¹⁷ From here on Phiffner is doing his own thinking based, of course, upon the Nicolaidis findings.

should be done according to the code of morality or ethics which governs the situation. The relation between morality and science has concerned philosophers throughout the ages. Those who lay a great store by the authority of the past will tend to place a stronger emphasis upon the normative approaches to rationality than those who are trained and conditioned in Western science. However, the matter is not confined to areas of religion and belief alone because it enters into the field of social values in Western industrial society as well. It goes to the heart of the fact-value controversy which formed the basis for the running controversy between Dwight Waldo and Herbert Simon.

The normative model of rationality is especially evident among professional groups who have rather well defined ideas or strong convictions about how people should behave or how an administrator should act in reference to their particular vocational or scientific interest. These views may or may not be based upon scientific evidence; they are normative in either case because they are often in conflict with strong elements of community opinion about whether they should or should not be done, apart from any disagreement on whether their factual premises are valid or not. An example is the dentist who believes that the public drinking water should be fluoridated. Other examples along this line are the law enforcement officer's attitudes toward the enforcement of the speed laws; the educationists' advocacy of a permissive approach to motivation as against the tougher disciplinary approach, the social worker's treatment approach to delinquency in contrast to the law enforcement officer's value to be tough on them, the conservative economist's value of a balanced budget in contrast to Galbraith's concept that a larger proportion of the national income should go into public expenditure, the medical profession's advocacy of immunization against contagious diseases, and many others of like nature, including the Forest Service's advocacy of selective cutting of timber as against clean-cutting.

The Behavioral Model

The behavioral model of rationality approaches human behavior objectively; attempt-

ing to describe, measure, and predict it. It is immaterial whether values can be excluded from facts and also whether it is possible to measure or predict human behavior. There are those who believe it is possible.

Certainly the skillful administrator has the ability to sense how people are going to react to his administrative actions and decisions, and he colors those actions and decisions to minimize adverse reception on the part of those affected. In many respects this is the very heart of administrative behavior, and it is the point at which the classical concept of rationality conflicts with administrative rationality. There is no question but what the administrator does take into account how people are expected to behave in the administrative situations in which he finds himself. It is a question as to the extent to which, in trimming his sails, he is acting intuitively or behaving in a manner which is deliberately calculated. It will be remembered that Nicolaidis said that so-called intuition often has a basis of rational explanation. The effective administrator takes into consideration a set of data which roughly corresponds to the data that social scientists are interested in. To be sure, it is not refined in the way that experimental social scientists would like to refine it nor is it analyzed or described in the way that the cultural social scientists would do it, but the fact remains that he is taking into account the probable human reactions to his decisions and actions. In doing so he is engaging in prediction although he would not call it that. Another way of saying it is that the effective administrator has a feel for power and that he is a good politician. The findings of the Nicolaidis study support this view very strongly.

The Resulting Decision Base

Administrative rationality embraces all three models, but it differs from the rationality of the engineer or scientist in that it makes greater use of the normative and behavioral models. Governmental researchers and professional administrators cannot escape being tainted with the brush of normative rationality. They bring their own personal value systems not the least value of which is that efficiency is more important than social reform.

This is the point upon which the political theorists of the last decade have attacked the public administration movement—the idea that efficiency is a value, an end in itself, and has desirable qualities which the deity would approve.

But above all, the successful budget administrator is a behavioral rationalist. For thirty years I have observed the men who have had to sit on the hot seat in making budgetary decisions in both the City and County of Los Angeles. In one of these offices, I have seen three men fail, two of them with broken health because they could not stand up under political and power pressures exerted upon them. Those who have been successful and survived have been especially skillful in handling the power factor and manipulating the political aspects of their jobs. Their recommendations were always backed up by the rationality of the classical model. In other words they had data. But this is not to say that such data may not have been colored by their own normative rationality.

In Summary

Policy—a rule of action intended to provide relative stability, consistency, uniformity, and continuity—is, in the administrative situation, the product of three different bodies of thought and knowledge: “engineering” or means-end rationality concerned primarily with physical phenomena; behavioral rationality concerned primarily with human behavior; and normative rationality concerned primarily with what ought to be. The good administrator uses all of these models of rationality in making a decision. A study of 332 decisions by administrators reveals, further, that an administrative decision is composed of component decisions made at a galaxy of points within the organization, and these are based on information which comes together from a similar galaxy of information points in and out of the organization. These cases support the outline of administrative decision-making drawn by Lindblom in an earlier issue of the *Review* as well as some of the conceptions of Herbert Simon.

An Excess of Freedom To Be Wrong

I learned a very painful but useful lesson during the war when, having gotten rather beaten down by consistent appearances before various committees of the Congress, I suggested to Senator O'Mahoney, after one of the Appropriations Committee meetings of the Senate, that this was getting to be terribly time-consuming and exhausting. . . . He said, in effect, just breathe deeply and this will pass off in time; go back and do your job and do not worry about this aspect of it. Which I did. . . . Subsequently [Dr. Albert Speer, a leading German industrialist] . . . expressed to our examiners that one of the reasons that the German economy collapsed and that the Wehrmacht was left inadequately supplied in the latter days was because under a dictatorship, once a department head got the nod from Hitler, he went ahead as a little dictator and rode his particular hobby without criticism. There was no performance audit run on him as his program continued. . . .

I said then if I had to choose between having a congressional committee breathe on the back of my neck as a form of performance audit and getting in the position as a department executive of riding some particular conviction or belief to the point of defeat I would choose a congressional hearing.

—ROBERT A. LOVETT, before the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, February 23, 1960.

The Mind of the Career Man

By FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX

U. S. Bureau of the Budget

WITH all the vaunted occupational mobility in the United States, the popular image of the successful man still seems to favor the freely roaming jack-of-all-trades. But the realities of our civilization belie this popular image. It is a civilization that makes training and experience precious assets—in business as well as in other pursuits, not the least in government. If the modern history of American public administration is essentially the story of the rise of the professional spirit, the fundamental reason must be found in the same forces that have created our economic order. Industrial society clamors for more and more trained and experienced human beings. Indeed, it is a career society, for better or for worse.

Politics and Administration

Although increasingly common in most walks of life, the career man holds a particularly important place in the management of public affairs. His primary task is to provide the needed technical competence in administration. In his entire performance, however, he must appreciate that the final decision in controversial matters is not likely to be one based on administrative criteria alone, but one reflecting value judgments that elected officeholders link with the will of the community. Under popular rule, a business that deals with the interest of the entire community, and with nothing else, must properly remain under the community's general direction.

Thus the management of public affairs is characterized by two functional structures. Its

» The role of career executive, which we have sought in these pages over many years, cannot be found without some sense of the kind of person he is. Here a mirror is held up for the public administrator, catching both strengths and weaknesses. The mirror has been polished by nearly three decades of government experience, informed by scholarship, both here and abroad.

conduct is the joint yet divided responsibility of chosen representatives of the people, on the one hand, and of appointed administrative officials, on the other. The responsibility is joint in an ultimate sense, in the electorate's response to what government does or fails to do. In an immediate sense, however, the responsibility is divided. General responsibility for policy, together with responsibility for what is usually called political actions, falls to the chosen representatives of the public, lastly in the battle for reelection. Administrative responsibility—under disciplinary authority—must be borne by the appointed public servants. This extends to recommendations proffered to policy-makers as well as to the effectiveness of administrative operations.

To be in the service of the community lends stature to the career man in government. To fit himself into the dual structure of responsibility is his hardest assignment. He contributes his competence and his skill to the welfare of the community, but the specific goals toward which his work is being directed are not set by him. They are set by those who were lifted into power by the voters. He can reason with them, as a good adviser must at times; yet he is not free to substitute his own view of the common good for the policy commitments of his political superiors. On the contrary, he must accept the guidance embodied in these policy commitments. Although responsibility for policy and responsibility for administration are divided, they are hence also inseparable in certain ways.

NOTE: This paper is based on a talk presented at the organization meeting of the Association of Alumni of the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California.

Only when the two are securely linked can it be said that government itself is responsible.

The intricacies of the resulting relationships between the career man and his policy masters represent a key factor in the performance of public service.

Inflexibility

Under democratic auspices, the most important standard of government is that the affairs of the people be administered in accordance with the people's preference. Those in whose hands the electorate has placed control over the political course will usually give closest attention to the effective attainment of policy ends. To them, administration is the vehicle meant to carry them to their goal, and with the least delay. By contrast, the career man, skilled in handling the vehicle, is much concerned with its proper use and its diligent care. He wants to do things "right"—that is, "right" from the expert's point of view. Quite like the policy-maker, he knows that the vehicle is indispensable for reaching the goal that has been set. Nor does he object to using the vehicle for getting there. But he is likely to insist that use of the vehicle in all particulars should conform to the judgment of the one who knows it best—his own.

Considering the reasons for the existence of the career man in government, this line of argument is not without some point. After all, he was trained to do his job, picked up priceless lessons in the school of experience, and is in many ways personally responsible for the condition of the administrative machinery. Policy-makers come and go, usually taking but negligible interest in the state of the machinery as it is passed on to their successors. Yet government itself is weakened when its administrative capability is impaired. In acting as the meticulous custodian of the means for accomplishing policy ends, the career man may well feel that he is safeguarding not only effective administration but also representative government, even the historic tenets of constitutional rule.

But it is in the nature of the expert to cherish what he knows, to worship at the altar of his own knowledge, and to smite both ignorance and heresy with inspired zeal. Unless he arouses himself to conquer this impulse, his world becomes self-contained and fixed. Things must be done the way he learned to

do them. Procedures must be applied without revision because they have acquired sanctity with time. Precedents must be honored because departures would bring forth a tidal wave of discretionary determinations, engulfing his nice, dry microcosm. For each current question, the answer stalks forward from the past; and being the voice of the past, it must be accepted with reverence. Innovation becomes obnoxious.

All this is not entirely unnatural when the reputation of being an expert—rather than what he actually can do—is seen by the career man as his principal stock in trade. From such an angle, it will become emotionally necessary for him to spend more time showing himself right than exploring alternatives that may be more helpful in moving toward the government's goals. Policy-makers who come to him with fresh ideas or administrative suggestions will find him resentful and defensive. Is it not he to whom all worthwhile insights would occur first? If pressure develops toward new approaches in meeting emerging administrative needs, the one thing policy-makers can be sure to hear from him is a story of obstacles and difficulties.

Needless to say, when the career man thus settles in the cocoon of his superior knowledge, he disqualifies himself for a large part of his job. That part consists of showing policy-makers how to use the administrative machinery for carrying out their program. For imaginative use of this machinery, the career man is the most logical source of information. If he is not blocked by his own inflexibility, he will think ahead for the policy-makers, explain to them how to rely on administrative measures for gaining their objectives, indicate the most promising avenues of action, and take on his full share of duty as counselor in helping to define the strategy of government.

Narrowness

Inflexibility is perhaps a form of narrowness. But the evil of narrowness assails the career man also in other forms. It may feed upon his training, his social status, his functional isolation—and even upon his nonpolitical credo.

In the United States, educational preparation for public service has long been enmeshed in a tradition of vocational training.

Even on the level of graduate study, great stress has been laid on the technology of public administration. Organization and procedures for program planning, budgetary control, position classification, management improvement and similar specialized fields of activity have tended to be at the center of attention.

One result has been that those entering government employment from the institutions of higher learning were generally able to find their way into productive work without much waste motion. To some degree, academic training sought to provide an equivalent to an otherwise necessary period of apprenticeship. The trained aspirants were made for the world of administration. For this very reason, however, they were far less well equipped to orient themselves in the larger political context. The world of the policy-maker seemed remote and perplexing. The relationship between political responsibility and administrative responsibility often remained obscure.

Nor is the normal social role of the career man an antidote to narrowness. Though "near the scene of exciting things," his participation in public affairs holds him to specified functions. His window is usually quite small. On the assembly line of government work, he is confined to particular operations. The completed institutional product may never appear plainly in his field of vision. Although he is its servant, the community at large lies toward the rim of his own life—a life dominated by his daily work, on the whole protected from political storms, predictable to a high degree, as neat and tidy as he wants it. In his privacy, he may be a walking encyclopedia on the compositions of Vivaldi, or a collector of ancient coins, or a writer of sonnets worthy of breaking into print. None of this, however, is likely to topple him from his middle-class island into the agitated seas about him.

Narrowness is also induced by the simple fact that the career man sits at his desk to do his job. Doing his job gives him plenty of worries. What comes to him on grounds of his competence cannot be passed on to policy-makers. He has to do it; and the more there is of it, the less can he afford to stretch himself thin by looking at the business of government through the policy-maker's glasses. In the chain of action, he is one link; and that is

what matters. He cannot—and should not—pretend to be the whole chain. He does his best job by doing his job. He renders best account of himself by sticking to his own knitting.

Moreover, is it not true that undue involvement in policy matters exposes the career man to the contagion of "politics"? As one of the peculiarities inherited from the history of governmental reform in the United States, he is particularly sensitive to the implications of the spoils system. His professional rationality appears to him as the practice of virtue. Conversely, the political rationality of policy-makers seems somehow compromised by the shadow of vice. To the career man the choice is easy. His entire occupational background urges him to stay on his side, to remain "clean."

But even if it were the greatest honor to be called a politician, those engaged in the administrative arts would still be prompted to place themselves into their own compartment. Their ways of thought would continue to be different from the ways of thought of policy-makers. Their intellectual processes would take different turns. Under conditions of party change in government, the permanent cadre could not expect to last and at the same time follow the policy-maker into the political arena. As the reverse of the coin, however, the career man is prone to withhold himself from the thunderous issues of politics and to regard his nonpolitical status as a toga of righteousness.

Specialization

It has sometimes been said that in the mushroom growth of specialization the only "generalist" is the politician. No doubt the statement cannot be taken literally. Too many representatives of the people owe too much to the love they evoke at the headquarters of various special interests. As a matter of fact, in the building of electoral support for political candidates it would be bold to ignore the organized interests, with their capacity for delivering votes or contributions—or both. But when the lawmaker, in his district, is dependent on a considerable array of interests, or when he is called upon to bring about a partial satisfaction of a whole string of special interests in a legislative compromise—then he may well have to demonstrate his genius as

"generalist." Moreover, he is a generalist by talking the language of the people, by trying to make general sense of the technical proposals advanced by specialists.

In coping with this task, the policy-maker is usually glad to have help, including the help of the career man—if it is available to him. Unfortunately, however, the career man, with dismal frequency, turns out to be a specialist himself, or even a source of specialized pressure. This may be provoking, but it is hardly astonishing. Here again, the career man's behavior is simply evidence of his having come up in a career.

Way back when he started out on that career, he was instructed to knock at a door admitting only reasonably well specialized aspirants. In fact, knowing that much in advance, he prepared himself assiduously to pass muster at the entrance. Next, so that the marking would not wash off, he was accordingly "classified." And so on and up. At first, he would have liked to slip out of his classification and into another one, perhaps even a third or fourth. He soon discovered his error. Such shifts might make life richer, but in moving from one classification to another it was very easy to miss the occupational escalators.

Indeed, even in the broadest view, administration itself is a specialization. When he explains to the policy-maker which administrative steps might be most advantageous in a particular situation, and which steps should definitely not be taken, he is drawing upon his specialized knowledge. To the policy-maker, he is a specialist for that very reason. Unwittingly, he also may be expressing himself in highly specialized language. Although his jargon is perhaps not unfamiliar to the policy-maker, misunderstandings do creep in, sometimes with very disagreeable consequences—all because administration is something of a mystery to the outsider. Unless the career man succeeds in being his own interpreter, he may give the policy-maker the impression of living in a little box all by himself.

Specialization creates a preoccupation with pieces, be they segments or techniques or processes or functions. The piece, not the whole, becomes the center of gravity, absorbing the attention of the participants. To be pulled away from the special toward the gen-

eral is resisted with all means. The monitor of the general aspect becomes the enemy. He must be kept out. Thus the spirit of specialization adds partition to partition, giving shelter to a fragmented functional kinship at the price of the larger unity. When the career man falls prey to this malady, he will readily convince himself that administrative responsibility and policy responsibility can never get together.

Integrity

Inflexibility, narrowness, specialization—these generate the kind of behavior that to the policy-maker will seem typically bureaucratic. They are influences that rise within the administrative setting, at work everywhere, as part of the occupational "facts of life." They can paralyze the free spirit, unless the career man is continuously on guard against them. It is not that these influences vanish before his good will or his devotion to duty. He needs to alert himself to their presence, to their persistence, and to their insidious effects. He must give combat in his own mind and fight the battle with his own personal resources.

In this struggle against the downward pull of his occupational environment, the career man is able to marshal great strength when he is guided by the counsel of integrity. Integrity demands more of him than not to steal. It goes beyond a conscious acceptance of the trust placed in him by both policy-makers and the public itself. It requires him to be responsive as well as responsible. But he is not to be a servile creature at the beck and call of those in power. In playing his public role, he must fully grasp its implications. True enough, it is for him to keep the wheels of administration going, to get things done, to render faithful support to the elected agents of the citizenry. But it is also his official duty so to shape his actions that they comply with the commands of law and the maxims of public ethics.

From this point of view, it cannot be a matter of indifference to the career man what influences impress themselves upon his mind. His mentality is too large a part of his effectiveness. Even though his attention is frequently diverted, he stands at a place where he can see more clearly than any one else how incessant is the drag of routine, the temptation of being busy by being busy, the push

into a pointless self-sufficiency. If there are forces about him that make him a robot, running breathlessly in ever smaller circles, he alone is able to mount his defense. His integrity provides him with the stamina to resist being molded by his environment and instead to mold it on the pattern of his public purpose. Whether or not he does is a question which affects decisively the general quality of administration.

Integrity as well as inflexibility plead for the observance of ground rules that are to be respected. But inflexibility—as here discussed—has no motive except the egocentric joy of living behind blinders, of being self-serving, of staying put. Integrity rebels against such corruption of the mind in the management of public affairs. The career man's integrity must affirm the instrumental role of the machinery of administration—by conceiving of administration as the other half of policy, as the essential vehicle of political purpose.

Breadth

No element of the general public finds it easier to know its mind, to tell what it wants, and to go after it with tenacity than the special interest. By contrast, government comes nearest to fulfilling its fundamental obligations when it reflects broadly integrated interests. The dynamics of the special interest can best be appreciated as a spontaneous phenomenon of nature. It is a given thing, the embodiment of reality. By contrast, to achieve basic coherence in response to interest pressure is the result of insight and energy, contributed deliberately. The noblest task of government—and the most arduous—is to unite the community in widely inclusive programs. It may therefore be said that to govern is to move in breadth.

This carries an important implication for the career man. Knowing that the weight of convenience in his workaday existence draws him toward a narrow outlook, he must give special attention to marking out the dimensions of issues coming before him. He must search for ramifications and repercussions that remain hidden at first sight. Both when he advises policy-makers on program questions and when—on his own level—he determines policy himself, he must be willing to unravel the raw data patiently, to spot as many relevant aspects of the problem as pos-

sible, and to assess the likely effects of promising solutions. It is for him, looking at matters through the eyes of administrative experience, to see more than is shown.

In its most obvious significance, such orientation is simply a much needed therapy for the career man against the ill of narrowness. But the effect carries beyond the plane of his own occupational situation. By contributing breadth of point of view, he makes it easier for the policy-maker to shoulder the full burden of government. Policy-makers need a line of defense against the special pleader. Policy-makers also need impartial information on aspects of issues not likely to occur to them from the experience they gain as organizers and appraisers of community sentiment.

It is not necessary for the career man to appoint himself an eagle-eyed detective to identify the fingerprints of the special interest. All that is asked of him is that he lay before the policy-maker a complete analysis of the facts. Facts do not stop "raids upon the public treasury." But verified facts make it very difficult to deceive the public by exploiting its ignorance. The more the career man, as the spokesman of administrative impartiality, succeeds in bringing into the open all of the angles of an issue, the less it is likely that the policy-maker will be entrapped by special pleaders. The more closely circumscribed the career man's horizon because of his own specialized approach, the less sensitive his nose will be to the scent of the special interest.

Moreover, the "permanent cadre" is apt to be more concerned than policy-makers with the continuity of government as a going business. When it comes to consistency in the conduct of governmental functions, to the fundamental coherence of the total program, to observance of sound principle, the career man is often able to raise points which cannot safely be overlooked but escape notice on the political stage. Engrossed in the immediate, the policy-maker may even hate to concede such points. But the momentary involvements of policy-makers are overshadowed by the constant role of government—not only what it is today, but also what it will be tomorrow. In holding before the policy-maker the larger canvas, the career man provides an eminently constructive service even though he may not be graciously received.

Spirit

If the career man alert to his duties cannot always expect the applause of his political masters, he should nevertheless be able to earn at least their reluctant esteem. As his integrity is tested in the trials of the day, he has ample opportunity for demonstrating his service morality. But integrity can turn sour. It must have the support of spirit.

This is not simply to say that dispirited integrity is perhaps more a liability than an asset. In his relations with his associates as well as with policy-makers, the career man cannot be blind to the factor of morale, including his own. He does not truly do his job if he habitually wears an expression of dejection or boredom, or seems lost to the cheerful word. Administration without energy is much less than half a loaf. And energy cannot be sustained without spirit.

But spirit is more important in a different sense—as public spirit. Public spirit is not what comes forth naturally in public offices. It is not an organic aspect of being in public employment. It has to be generated. It repre-

sents an achievement, the result of dedication as well as maturity.

No doubt public spirit is not a monopoly of those in the public service. It manifests itself not seldom as the quickening influence supplied by policy-makers. Indeed, public spirit is the mark of the citizen—as he ought to be. But those who serve the public in the nature of their employment have a particular reason to cultivate public spirit.

When the career man consciously devotes himself to service, he must be able to displace within himself his private interests to the extent that these would be in the path of his public responsibilities. But that is only the first step. In addition, he must learn to recognize the difference between the public, as the generality of men, and the milling multitudes formed into many separate publics. By becoming subservient to any one public, he fails the general public. Above all, his public spirit should grow with thought and time into a guide toward the common good. Although the standard is exacting, it is the evidence of public spirit that signals the career man's real worth.

Let's Save Some Money

In one large municipality the budget director was reluctant to approve large expenditures, but inclined to be expansive with relatively small items.

The annual budget request of one of the operating departments included the following, designed to provide for proper storage of a large number of important maps:

OFFICE EQUIPMENT. Map Filing Cabinet consisting of: (a) regular section, 5 drawers, \$150; (b) polished hardwood top, \$18; (c) polished hardwood base, \$18.

In another section of the request, the amount of \$2,150 was included for the purchase of a badly needed truck.

The budget examiner approved parts (b) and (c) of the office equipment item, but eliminated part (a) of the request as being too expensive. He arbitrarily reduced the truck item to \$1,075.

These decisions were endorsed by the legislative body, and the department was thus authorized to purchase a cabinet top and a cabinet base, but not the cabinet itself, and also to acquire, presumably, half a truck.

—WILLIAM BRODY, Philadelphia Department of Health; formerly with the National Jewish Hospital in Denver, the U. S. Economic Stabilization Agency, War Labor Board, and New York City Health Department.

Management in the USSR— Comparisons to the United States

By MARSHALL E. DIMOCK

*Professor of Government
New York University*

ONE of the main conclusions we came to on the governors' trip to the USSR in the summer of 1959 was that Soviet Russia will soon become a powerful competitor of the West in world trade. She has the resources, a good deal of knowhow, and most important of all, her management methods, while still considerably behind those of the United States, have markedly improved in recent years. We were impressed with the caliber of executive personnel we found at the state and local levels in Russia and felt that if the Soviets were able to reproduce this type (though there is some doubt that they can) they could look forward to a constantly rising standard of living. (We were inclined to hope that they would succeed since prosperity might diminish rather than increase the threat of war.)

Russia has consciously imitated the United States in the field of management. Khrushchev, who seldom admits that Russia is not first in everything, told us that his country had two things to thank the Americans for—hybrid corn and scientific management of the Frederick W. Taylor variety. Russian administration, large-scale and bureaucratic, is more like our own in some respects than that of any other country. Although we have little to learn from them now at the exchange-of-experience level, an objective consideration of what makes Russian administration tick might throw some light on such major issues of administration as planning, decentraliza-

» For many years, the Soviet Union has tried to impose a high degree of national planning on its huge governmental organism and has tried to enforce the plan through organizations outside the regular government machinery—the party, the trade unions, and the secret police. Recent USSR efforts to decentralize tip us off to the failure of highly centralized planning and control. They also offer important information on a problem commanding attention throughout the world—finding the right combination of initiative and coordination in massive organizations. Here, these questions are sketched in the light of Soviet and American practice and thought, with comparisons of education for public administration and its relevance.

tion, control, career systems, incentives, and bureaucracy. Since administration now determines an advanced country's way of life, successful wrestling with these issues may spell the difference between the success of our system or the triumph of theirs.

Present Conditions

Some 55 million persons are directly employed by government in the USSR as contrasted with around seven million in the United States. The difference lies in their government's operation of most of industry as well as what we consider governmental functions.

Their gross national product, Allen Dulles recently told a congressional committee, is only 45 per cent of ours, but by planning and priority determinations, they are achieving equal military effort. Their per capita standard of living is only one-fourth of that enjoyed in this country but their rate of economic growth is about double our own. The paradox is partly explained by the lower level from which they started and the rigid controls

NOTE: This article is condensed from an address given at the National Conference of the American Society for Public Administration, April 13, 1960.

that keep consumer goods from expanding as fast as the GNP. Their labor and managerial efficiency is lower than ours; again quoting Allen Dulles, their industrial production is only 40 per cent of this country's, but it requires 20 per cent more labor to produce it. Nearly one-half of their total labor force works on farms; by using only 10 per cent of our much smaller labor force, we produce as much farm products.

They have made vast strides in education, however. Among executives, for example, 80 per cent had college degrees as of 1952 compared with 57 per cent in the United States. Of all college students, 82 per cent receive educational grants from the governments. Working one's way through college is severely frowned upon, though "proletarian."

There are areas of the economy in which the Russians are notoriously poor administrators by American standards: housing and highway administration, for example, where we of the governors group had an opportunity to observe and judge. But at the same time—and this is part of a series of paradoxes—the Russians have scored outstanding triumphs in some areas, such as space exploration and the Moscow subway. This unevenness is due in part to their system of priorities: they do well the things they consider most important at the time and defer until later things that can wait.

Quite generally, more people are required to produce a given output than in other industrialized countries. Khrushchev admitted to the governors, for example, that there are 200,000 more people in Moscow than are needed and that the government had tried unsuccessfully to move them to underdeveloped areas where they would be more useful. Some part of their boasted total unemployment, therefore, includes an element of underemployment which is found almost everywhere but notably on the farms.

The History of Administrative Development

The emphasis in Russia on Taylorism and scientific management is relatively new. At the time of the Russian revolution its leadership entertained the naive notion of most socialists, Lenin going so far as to say that administration is so simple that it can be done by any literate person. The underlying idea was that the disappearance of private property and the conflict between owners and man-

agers would result in improvement in morale that would assure greater over-all efficiency. But this assumption soon proved false. Interest groups, factions, and cliques exist in all large organizations, even in societies demanding ideological conformity. And most important of all, the pathology of bureaucracy increases with size and complexity and the Russians have been slow to cope with it largely because their dogmas prevented their anticipating and learning to deal with it.

Therefore, in the first period of Soviet development, from 1917-1924, when planning was starting, the situation was little short of chaotic. As Merle Fainsod has shown in *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule*,¹ local soviet chieftains tended to enrich themselves from the spoils of capitalist ex-owners, family nepotism was widespread, and graft and inefficiency flourished. Threatened from without and impoverished within, a centralization from Moscow was clamped down upon local areas, with commissars, secret police, and efficiency auditors swooping down on local areas where disorganization and graft existed.

During the next period, 1924-1937, there was a marked improvement. Planning got underway. A large and effective program of administrative training was inaugurated. The country began to prepare to defend itself. By the time of the Hitler invasion, the world no less than the Nazis was surprised at the advances that had been made in Russian organization and management.

Spurred by the motive of survival during the war, men and women showed natural administrative talents they might not have developed to the same degree in peacetime. Americans, of course, did too, and without the same physical threat.

A new administrative era began in 1957 when Khrushchev announced the decentralization program that was the focus of interest for the governors. During this modern period there has been somewhat less emphasis on formal training for administration but more on education generally. Whether this is due to complacency with administrative improvement or whether the new preparation for administration is an advance over that of 1924-1937 time will show. My own feeling is that there may be an unjustifiable complacency at present; that natural selection of leadership

¹ Harvard University Press, 1958.

without special preparation is not a sufficient antidote to innate bureaucracy; and that the problems Russia faces in administration are infinitely more formidable than our own, unless, of course, we should become overly complacent ourselves.

Organization and Planning

Russia attempts to secure high motivation by a detailed form of planning and goal-setting, then tries to secure administrative leadership by giving local managers a unified authority which includes discretion as to method. This is by no means a novel contribution to management thinking, for it is the objective of most large corporations in the United States. Centralization of planning and decision-making, decentralization of operations and problem-solving: that is the magic formula in both countries.

Then Russia tries to secure coordination by combining three factors, running vertically from the bottom to the top of the pyramid: line administration, planning administration, and party organization. Admittedly this is a difficult feat—some would say an impossible one—and yet it must be admitted that it has elements of effectiveness if it can be operated. Coordination is widely acknowledged to be the most difficult problem of large-scale administration in the United States. How much more difficult it must be where all of industry and government are combined and 55 million people are directly employed by the government. A common Soviet statement is that the most important part of a plan is not the plan but its execution.

Russian planning is much like our budget estimates procedure. While the top echelon, consisting of the chief executive and his planning board, determines large issues of policy, such as what areas of the country to develop next and how much capital to drain off from established areas for that purpose, administrators at the lowest levels of administration begin planning their own next year's program. The process starts simultaneously at the very top and at the very bottom. The three kinds of plans are seven year, annual, and revisions of the annual plan. The higher the level of jurisdiction the more likely is it that planning will be long range instead of immediate, but emphasis on all three types of planning is attempted at all levels.

A seven-year plan serves at least two purposes: it is a target for the economy and it constitutes the guideline projection for every operational administrator. His one year plan is much more detailed, however, because it is more immediate and further advanced in terms of implementation. The operational officer is consulted in the development of both plans but the final decision is made at the top, where the need of the operational officer and the priority system for the country as a whole are brought together. Quotas in the seven year plan are as precise as possible and each plan is completed before the next is commenced; but although they are not "moving" targets, everyone knows that beyond the immediate seven year plan a new one is already being projected in the drafting offices.

Take health administration as an example of annual budgeting and planning: the health officer in a district outside Leningrad makes his plan; at the Leningrad level it is combined with others; the Leningrad plan is submitted to the republic; and finally the State Planning Board (Gosplan) puts together all the fifteen republic plans plus the estimates of the central government and compares the total with the original estimates of the chief executives.

Paralleling the line officials at each of these levels, there is a planning officer forming a dual hierarchy. At each level the planning officer deals with his superior planning official and at the same time with the line officer on his own level.

This planning officer has a considerable influence. He is almost without exception a party member; he belongs to the planning apparatus; he does most of the speaking for the action program in the planning process; and in consequence of all this the operational head, although he has the decision-making power at his operational level, must win over the planning officer if he is to be assured of unified support. In case of a request for reconsideration by higher authority, however, it is the operating head who argues the case. Hence it is a rather thorough-going system of dual hierarchy. The planning officer has considerably more influence than our budgetary officer in operational administration; his party membership and his position in the planning hierarchy make that certain. But both the operating head and his planning officer are

usually party members, providing the essential link between them.

But policy disagreements constantly occur, as they are bound to. Between the operational head and his planning officer it may be a question of how much to spend on education as compared with health, whether to train technicians locally or at a regional institute, or whether to use centralized or decentralized control devices. On policy matters the problem will either be resolved by the intercession of the local party organization, which keeps track of such things, or by bucking up the question to higher authority in the organizational hierarchy. Since Khrushchev came into power it has apparently been easier for officials at lower levels to argue their cases up the line even to the Politburo, and there is a deputy for planning directly under Khrushchev. Here the kind of question that arises is whether to start a new experiment in diversified agriculture or whether to concentrate upon a one-crop economy, such as cotton; whether to reclaim land by irrigation or whether to invest the funds in "virgin" lands—in other words, questions which involve a hearing at the top are usually substantive economic issues and not ones involving organization and personality. Strictly administrative matters tend to be taken care of by the local party organization acting as watchdog.

Conflict seldom generates great friction. The theory is that the production head's views should have greatest weight in a disagreement because everything is subordinate to production. In addition, party men are usually experienced administrators and hence learn when not to interfere. Then, too, party officials often spend only part-time on party work and hence are not tempted to interfere as much as they might if not otherwise employed. Another factor is that squabbling and infighting are considered bad form; an excessive amount of it is likely to lead to demotion or some other disciplinary action. The final decision, of course, comes from higher authority, guided by the sentiment of the local party organization, and unswerving compliance is demanded.

Considering how important personality, pressure group, and vocational interest are, however, and how much honest disagreement there may be on policy matters even among

the faithful, it is clear that planning in the USSR, despite its often undeserved reputation for precision, requires a good deal of human relations lubrication to make it work smoothly. And since constructive criticism under the Russian system, including that of local trade unions, is a duty and not a privilege, there is far more vigorous disagreement than might be expected under a totalitarian system.

One of the main advantages of centralized planning is that relevant information coming in at one point is made available at others. Apparently this feature of the system has worked pretty well. But a requirement of effective planning is that decisions made on high be faithfully executed below. Here the Russians do not fare so well. Apparently there is still plenty of institutional resistance and the more they decentralize the greater is the danger that distortion of the plan will increase.

Decentralization

Russia had to decentralize in 1957 in order to avoid breakdown of administration, but even after decentralization it is still somewhat incredible that her system operates as well as it does when one imagines trying to run the economy of a country twice as large as the United States through scores of industrial ministries in Moscow. Assuming that human intelligence could plan so complicated a *mélange*, how would you go about coordinating it and giving the local managers the freedom they need?

What Khrushchev did in 1957 was to transfer all but a few essential industrial programs and state businesses to the republic governments, as a holding company in this country might lop off its subsidiaries. These republics could develop long-range plans of their own indicating some loosening of the monolithic national plan, but there was no intention of relaxing the control of the Communist party over the whole economy or reducing the power of the Praesidium or the Council of Ministers in Moscow. Rather, the policy seemed to be to loosen the administrative hold and tighten the party grip.

It was simple, hardheaded business necessity that led them to decide to do less centrally and more locally. But fearing that decentralization might be carried too far and realizing

that coordination would be weakened, the Khrushchev government also created 104 regional economic councils covering the whole country, like a continuous series of TVA's. It is still too early to say how well these agencies are working or whether they will survive. Their function is to serve as the economic high command for a region with somewhat homogeneous characteristics: one where heavy industry predominates, for example, or where there is a single-crop economy, as in the cotton belt. But some councils have problems of diversified enterprise, and here the difficulties are greater. Coordination across regional economic lines does not take place automatically; recently, therefore, the Khrushchev government has found it necessary to create an All-Russian Economic Council to coordinate the work of the separate councils. This is obviously a step back toward centralization and an implied admission that lateral coordination had its faults; that in a monolithic structure it is difficult if not impossible to decentralize without going back through Moscow for necessary coordination.

Is it any wonder then that the system is complicated and hard to understand? The Economic Councils are involved in planning, but there is also the nationwide hierarchy for planning. In this area, therefore, the councils make suggestions but they have little power of independent decision. When it comes to execution, however, they act in a manner comparable to that of a management trust or the general staff of the military: here they do have a considerable power and authority. But it is largely a power of persuasion that must flow through hierarchical channels and party organization to become effective. Here, then, is one of the crucial areas that bears watching, for regionalism, though often imperative, is a difficult system to administer.

Another problem of decentralization has to do with adding new activities to a total coordination process, as is likely to happen if Russia moves further toward satisfying the pent-up demand for consumer goods. From an administrative standpoint, the problem of expanding a government or business operation, although presenting some difficulties, is not insuperable. This happens constantly in both countries. But what happens when "quality" goods such as cosmetics, women's finery, and other luxury goods are put on the market,

may be a different story. Who is going to take up these new lines of business? The republics? This would be normal under the 1957 decentralization policy. But where? One of the chain stores? An organization that is adequate for standardized mass operations is usually deficient in quality operations and sales approach. I anticipate therefore that before long the Soviet rulers will discover that when the ability of governments to run economic services is measured alongside the demand for new "quality" businesses, something will have to give. The movement is likely to be still further toward decentralization and non-bureaucratic administration.

Those of us who went on the governors' trip could not help being impressed with the fact that when we talked with state and local officials the atmosphere was relaxed, with almost no attempt to indoctrinate on either side. How different it was, however, when we got to the national level and talked with Khrushchev and Mikoyan! The sparks immediately began to fly, insults were traded, the meeting threatened to break up. I was reminded of Charles E. Merriam's observation that since so much of public administration relates to human welfare, this profession will tend to reduce international tensions and forge new linkages between nations. This certainly seemed to be the case on our trip. An irrigation ditch is an irrigation ditch; houses are either built to stand or to fall down. On this level, discussing of concrete contributions to human welfare, we could converse easily and in general agreement. So it seemed that if we could afford to decentralize and relate our lesser officials with theirs, we would soon make big strides toward peace within if not between hostile belief systems.

Although Soviet rulers may not anticipate it, it seems clear that decentralization will add still further to the forces that tend to change the Communist regime and cause it to relax. These local loyalties have increased, competing with party dogmas. And as the elite ruling Russia is broadened by according more power and recognition to local leaders, the character of the regime must ultimately show modifications. Simultaneously, as wealth increases, consumer demand will rise irresistibly. As education increases, more people will demand to view the outside world.

Control Activities

The need for coordination and control increases with decentralization. Many Russian control methods do not differ greatly from our own. There are plans, reports, audits, inspections by visiting teams of experts.

But there is also control by outside organizations. The secret police has played a decreasing role, and local trade unions and party organizations have had to take up the slack. Trade unions perform a number of important functions: they criticize management including the attitudes of higher-ups, through officially constituted channels, and emphasize suggestion systems. Working through the local party organization, they wield a considerable indirect as well as a direct influence on administrative operation and control.

Opposite every line officer and his supporting planning officer is a party functionary—not within the same organization but parallel to it. Stalin explained this by saying: "The party is the core of power. The party directive has the force of law." So it is no exaggeration to say that administrative organization is merely the creature of the party and that an agent represents the party organization at each level to see that things go according to plan.

Party members are an elite corps—about 4 per cent of the population. They are judiciously stationed throughout the power structure: the manager of a collective farm, the head of an industrial plant. They are also distributed throughout the bureaucracy with definite objectives in mind. As explained to us, these people are "sparkplugs," supplying morale and leadership; they are watchdogs, checking on professional civil servants and keeping them in line; they are coordinators.

Party members could not fill these roles if they were too numerous. If they filled all of the positions in the bureaucracy, the checks and balances would immediately be thrown out of kilter. Too much fraternization might lead to conspiracy and corruption; hence the elite, the dedicated man or woman, stands a little apart.

Naturally the party organization cannot do the whole job. There is a Central Auditing Bureau also, with travelling auditors who descend on state and local agencies unannounced.

Penalties are stiff for being caught violating

rules or missing quotas, probably decreasing the need for inspectors. Stalin's sanctions are too well known to need reminder. Under Khrushchev, they are demotion, transfer, dismissal—the usual administrative remedies. And in a country where the government is monopolistic, you don't make more than one bad mistake.

Yet there is no question that the ablest and best executives constantly take chances. Bureaucratic excess requires it. If you are a plant manager or a bureau chief and the rules and regulations prevent your getting a job done, or if coordination above you is lacking, what do you do? You have two choices: either do nothing and fail or skirt around the edges of the rules and make a record for accomplishment. Under Khrushchev there is evidence that the emphasis is on results rather than on administrative impeccability. Hence the number of risk-takers is increasing and something like the American businessman type is appearing, which tends still further to crack the monolithic structure of the communist state. The best information on this point is found in Edward Crankshaw's books² and in David Granick's *The Red Executive*.³

Bureaucracy and Education

So long as the Russian rulers are unwilling to reduce the functions of government considerably, however, I see no hope that they will ever be able to overcome their bureaucratic problems. They have simply exceeded the maximum range of functions that can be administered and coordinated efficiently.

I think there is already an awareness of this problem among the top scholars and scientists of the country and also among many industrial managers. They speak disparagingly about "politicians." Scientists complained to our party that bureaucracy interferes with scientific research; that this problem is discussed more frequently than any other in meetings of the academic senate. Despite the strain put by this huge system on our knowledge of operating organizations, the government has rejected suggestions to step up research in the social sciences.

The forces feeding bureaucratization are

² Khrushchev's *Russia* (Penguin Books, 1960), *Russia Without Stalin: The Emerging Pattern* (Viking Press, 1956).

³ Doubleday and Company, 1960

being fattened almost constantly. What is bureaucracy if not a stratification and narrowness flowing from excessive specialization? The Russian educational pattern and power structure contribute to these results much more than do our own.

Since Khrushchev's ascendancy, the Academy of Sciences has attained high status with lines running directly to the universities, the national planning machinery, the big businesses. Russia has become a society of technologists and managers, a far cry from the original idea of the proletariat of factory and farm. Intellectual work has been legitimized and is now considered more prestigious than manual labor, and there is no hiding the result: a technocracy, a scientific society, run by a managerial class.

The top man in any field is a theoretician, which is in striking contrast to our own system but not dissimilar to that of many European countries. The top physician, lawyer, engineer, or other professional holds a chair in a university that entitles him to the highest salary and the highest respect.

Add to these factors the Russian system of education, which is much more specialized and narrowing than ours, and you will see why bureaucratic excess is a greater problem in the USSR than in this country. Russian professors train their students to memorize and to think rigorously; we train ours to think for themselves broadly and to solve problems. Russian professors are highly theoretical and rely on doctrines, whereas we pride ourselves on our pragmatic, "cut and try" approach and look with suspicion on too much theory. In our better schools, we encourage originality and creativeness from the earliest years of schooling, whereas in Russia this is left until the formal fact-gathering process has been completed and the man is on the job. Comparatively speaking, we train our administrators to be generalists, encouraging a catholicity of interest to help shape the individual's philosophy and personality and make him more personable and human. The Russians consider this important, too, but they look to Communist youth organizations—their equivalent of extracurricular school activities—or to the home, the office, the workshop, or the government office, to mould the creative side of a man's nature.

Hence as Granick says in his interesting dis-

cussion of this problem, in both countries we try to come out with the same result, but we reverse the timing and the sequence. In the United States we rely on the formal influences of education for all of a man's nature; the Russians concentrate solely on his intellect. We teach human relations and other foundation subjects of administration in the classroom; they rely on organizations not primarily dedicated to education, notably party youth groups and employing agencies. I do not pretend to know which is the better system, but it seems clear from other studies that Russian education predisposes people to excessive bureaucratization more than the American system does.

In both countries, however, there is the common problem of how to keep intellectual workers related to factory and farm, where manual work is done. An economics professor of mine in 1925 stated repeatedly, "Our owning families are in danger of losing out in this country; the fathers worked with their hands and built businesses from the ground up; their sons are too proud to work with their hands and think they must start at the top. I expect to see a decline of inventiveness and sound human relations as a result." This is almost verbatim what our Russian hosts told us when we asked about the reasons for their new law requiring all students to spend a minimum of six months at work before winning an academic degree. Was this done to make them more "practical"? No, came the reply, to enable them to understand the dignity of work and what goes on in the minds and spirits of those who work with their hands all their lives. This is particularly needed in the USSR for Communism is and always has been an elite system.

Granick states that in all probability the average Russian manager is better insulated against becoming an organization man than is his American counterpart. After talking with Russian intellectuals, I think the opposite. For one thing, few Russian college students are permitted to earn their way through college; it is looked down upon. In the United States, by contrast, the practice is highly regarded and encouraged; even in a private institution such as New York University, 40 per cent of the students earn all or part of their total costs. The self-made man still is the backbone of the capitalist system;

equally the academic man is the requirement of a planned system. The fact that Russia now has a larger proportion of college-trained men in management posts than does the United States is not necessarily a mark of superiority, considering the different objectives of the two systems.

Training for Management

Of all the practices we noted on our trip through the USSR, the different approach to the education of managers and the utilization of incentive systems probably stood out most.

In this country something like one-seventh of all college students are enrolled in schools of business and they are the largest single group in higher education. The Russian student going into management almost invariably will study engineering. If he is headed for planning or one of the economic councils, he will study a combination of engineering and economics. If he is going into one of the traditional governmental services, he will study similar subjects, such as engineering, public health, or education. In other words, he will concentrate in a substantive field. There may be a course on management, but it will be thrown in and not be made the main emphasis.

Those who are destined for middle and top management are enrolled in one of the party schools after the usual education. There they learn to be administrators and party officials. There are many of these party schools at all levels, leading up to the top school in Moscow which is affiliated with the central committee of the party. Students here are of three classes: full-time, part-time, or correspondence. Many fall into the middle category. They are prepared to enter three careers: middle management, top management, or information and propaganda. Not much is known about these schools, for, being party schools, their methods and curricula are not open to outside scrutiny.

Incentives

The most surprising discovery we made, however, is the extent to which the Russians use an incentive system, even a capitalist one. When we asked Khrushchev about this he blandly replied, "Yes, we use monetary incentives. Why not? It works. We used to think you were hardheaded, too, but recently we've

begun to wonder." The incentives the Russians have been using may be compared with the piece work system where income varies with output. This is the opposite of the civil service system, where distinctions are generally minimized as much as possible.

A Russian business manager and his entire staff will have a quota established by the over-all plan—so much quantity, so much value in rubles. If they exceed the quota, they receive a bonus and divide it according to pre-arranged percentages. On a collective farm we visited, for example, the manager received 8,000 rubles a month salary and his bonus for the previous year had amounted to 3,500 rubles. We also found that whereas there had originally been one class of pay for collective farm participants, there now are five classes to reflect differences in skills. And finally, Russia is trying to do away with direct personal taxes as a main source of revenue and to substitute indirect manufacturing or sales taxes instead: the top individual income tax is 13 per cent in the USSR, for example. So salary and bonus differentials mean a great deal. The Soviets are trying to make this monetary incentive system universal, and apparently they are succeeding. Conceivably it could lead to an unbearable speed-up and collapse, however.

Other forms of incentives resemble those used by the British: decorations and distinctions, the prestige motive. All artists in the USSR, for example, are divided into four categories, each with a title such as People's Artist of the USSR, in order to create a competitive spirit. The Russian propaganda line continually urges altruistic-patriotic devotion to production also. And patriotism seems to be a strong force. Although few intellectuals, and particularly scientists, are party members—they seem to wall themselves off from the grosser manifestations of power politics by retreating into worlds of their own—they do have a strong and deep patriotism to Russia. I cite this to indicate that motivation is by no means simple. The regime may be monolithic but the belief system is not. The attitude toward capitalist incentives, alone, seems to prove that.

Summary

Forces inherent in both centralization and bureaucracy tend to transcend the political

differences of the USSR and the United States. The Russians rely on planning to secure greater areas of freedom of action than operating officials have had; we are trying to decide whether additional planning would limit our greater operating freedom; if so how much and is it worth the cost. Their system of planning and control facilitates coordination; we still have trouble in these areas. They have borrowed our economic incentive system; we

seem to be dropping it—perhaps more than we should. Their educational system encourages thoroughness and mental discipline, ours originality and resourcefulness. In the end, both countries attempt to add these factors together to produce totals that are somewhere near equal, for such are the imperatives in large-scale administration. The stakes are large, for the mastery of these balances is the key to survival and influence.

The Power of the Powerful

Poseidon [more popularly Neptune, god of the sea] sat at his desk, going over the accounts. The administration of all the waters gave him endless work. He could have had as many assistants as he wanted, and indeed he had quite a number, but since he took his job very seriously he insisted on going through all the accounts again himself, and so his assistants were of little help to him. It cannot be said that he enjoyed the work; he carried it out simply because it was assigned to him; indeed he had frequently applied for what he called more cheerful work, but whenever various suggestions were put to him it turned out that nothing suited him so well as his present employment. Needless to say, it was very difficult to find him another job. After all, he could not possibly be put in charge of one particular ocean. Quite apart from the fact that in this case the work involved would not be less, only more petty, the great Poseidon could hold only a superior position. And when he was offered a post unrelated to the waters, the very idea made him feel sick, his divine breath came short and his brazen chest began to heave. As a matter of fact, no one took his troubles very seriously; when a mighty man complains one must pretend to yield, however hopeless the case may seem. No one ever really considered relieving Poseidon of his position; he had been destined to be God of the Seas since time immemorial, and that was how it had to remain.

What annoyed him most—and this was the chief cause of discontent with his job—was to learn of the rumors that were circulating about him; for instance, that he was constantly cruising through the waves with his trident. Instead of which here he was sitting in the depths of the world's ocean endlessly going over the accounts, an occasional journey to Jupiter being the only interruption of the monotony, a journey moreover from which he invariably returned in a furious temper. As a result he had hardly seen the oceans, save fleetingly during his hasty ascent to Olympus, and had never really sailed upon them. He used to say that he was postponing this until the end of the world, for then there might come a quiet moment when, just before the end and having gone through the last account, he could still make a quick little tour.

—FRANZ KAFKA, *Description of a Struggle*, translated by Tania and James Stern (Schocken Books, 1958). Submitted by Lewis C. Mainzer, University of Massachusetts.

Overcoming Resistance to Major Change—Vietnam Budget Reform

By MARVIN MURPHY

Budget Specialist

Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group

Of all countries I have visited in this region, Vietnam has by far the most advanced and up-to-date system of managing a budget," a United Nations budget expert said in Saigon recently, according to a newspaper report.

Only five years before, the Michigan State University technical assistance group (MSUG) found the system grossly inadequate and reported to President Ngo Dinh Diem that his office "is not at present equipped to give leadership and direction to the Government in the development and control of economic and budgetary policy. . . ." The President requested a budget specialist through MSUG to advise on the strengthening and modernizing of the budget system. In 1956 I arrived in that capacity.

Adviser to Whom?

Although I had had some experience in attempting to bring about administrative change within government in the United States and was aware that anyone attempting to effect changes in established institutions faced an arduous task, I naively assumed that the task would be easier in a developing country. I expected to meet a staff of Vietnamese budget officials who were eager to make improvements in the system and who awaited my arrival with anticipation.

My illusions disappeared rapidly. I soon found that there were no effective channels formally established through which I could offer advice and assistance. No one in the Vietnamese government requested my aid.

➤ Social scientists recently have turned attention to the process of effecting change in organizations, a subject which management analysts have worried about for many years—at least since Frederick W. Taylor wrote, "If anyone expects large results in six months or a year in a very large works he is looking for the impossible." While waiting for some theory from scholars that might guide public administrators in installing improvements, practitioners may find ideas and theory-builders data in this case study of a nimble attack against an archaic system well-protected by status quo-seekers.

Apparently only the President saw any great need to change the existing system.

Soon after my arrival I called upon the financial counselor to the President and the director of the budget to offer my services. I was cordially and courteously welcomed but no effective working relationships were developed. Because his office had little influence and authority within the government, the budget director was in no position at this time to take the lead in carrying out reform even though he may have recognized the need, and the financial counselor, while aware of deficiencies in the existing system, believed that the obstacles to major reform were too great to warrant any effort to correct them. He feared that complicated changes in procedure would not be understood by employees and that disruption resulting from efforts to amend the existing system would lead from disorder to chaos.

Finding an Entré

One does not need to be particularly empathic to realize the position of many Vietnamese officials. They agreed that American concepts and methods were suitable for Amer-

ica but argued that Vietnam's system was based upon French practices which had worked well in the past. Why should it be changed? How well did the "experts" understand the traditional system? Were they aware of the particular needs of Vietnam and the physical, psychological, and administrative environment within which the budget system had to function? These questions were openly posed or repeatedly implied, and it was obvious to me that a re-examination of my approach to reform was required. To establish a proper foundation, I would first have to demonstrate to the Vietnamese officials that I did have an adequate knowledge of their system, its antecedents, philosophy, and application and its procedural detail. Second, I had to convince them that I had the technical knowledge and skill in budgeting needed to help them. Finally, I had to assist them to gain sufficient information on the principles and techniques of modern budgeting to enable them to appraise their own system and my recommendations.

Any opportunity for contact with top government officials was sought, but no formalized arrangements for consultation were in sight. However, part of my assignment was to teach budgeting to both present and prospective government personnel, and I turned to training hoping to find there an opportunity for contact with budget leaders, even though they would not be attending classes themselves.

The solution decided upon had a reverse twist. Abandoning the effort to seek out executives to offer my advice on budget systems, I sought their advice on my teaching program, explaining that I needed background information and wanted their review and comment on the lectures and course materials. In this way informal relationships developed which provided a basis for communication and the growth of confidence. And the executives were exposed to the budgeting ideas to be presented in the course.

Before any teaching program was organized, however, another channel became available. The President appointed a Vietnamese committee to study budgetary and financial questions, chaired by the financial counselor to the President and including some of the top financial and budget officials of the government. Several staff members of MSUG

worked with the Committee. The major objective of the Committee was narrow, however—to determine the relationship of provincial fiscal administration to the national administration, and it lapsed after three meetings. By then, though, the chairman had asked me to prepare a report which would explain to the Committee the modern budgeting and accounting concepts which could be applied to national programs carried out in the provinces. Although the Committee never considered the report formally, all members received it and several expressed an interest in discussing particular recommendations. These discussions were held informally with individual members. There was no unanimity in the reaction to the recommendations. Each official agreed with some and opposed others. In these conversations I did not argue or defend my recommendations, though opposition based on a lack of understanding was met with further explanation. At the same time, these conversations gave me an opportunity to learn more about the existing system and the attitudes and views of Vietnamese officials.

To become thoroughly familiar with the existing system, I also had the benefit of work done by several excellent research people, some in MSUG, some not.

Teaching As a Step Toward Reform

The teaching program got started with a course in budgeting for undergraduates of the National Institute of Administration. Lectures, in both English and Vietnamese, were mimeographed and distributed to the students before each session. Courtesy copies were sent to the financial counselor, the budget director and other officials, and periodically I went to them to discuss the lectures and get their suggestions.

Soon after the completion of the Institute course, an in-service training course in budgeting, accounting, and organization and methods was organized for the fifteen top staff members of the Budget Directorate. Emphasis in the course was pragmatic rather than theoretical, on what could be done and why as well as how to do it. For example, a model budget policy statement was prepared in class as were allotment schedules and budgetary control reports. Wherever possible, instruction was related and applied to the existing system, even where this meant present-

ing techniques that were something less than the best we knew.

Initially some of the participants exhibited resentment at being required to attend class. While not openly hostile, many showed a skepticism about the value of the training. The first few sessions became almost a contest between the students and me to determine who was going to teach whom. However, when the students became aware that I knew something about their system, when they came to recognize its shortcomings themselves, and when they found a receptive attitude toward their proposals and comments, the negative attitude evaporated. As the course proceeded, I developed a rapport with several of the key staff members in the class which was of great help to me both during the course and later in working with the government.

It became apparent within a few months that the teaching program was having an effect. At informal gatherings where members of MSUG met Vietnamese officials, the conversation often turned to budgeting. Many proposals for reform came from government officials and reflected a constructively critical examination of the budget system and an increasing awareness of alternative approaches as explained in the course.

The Breakthrough

In early 1957 the move came which led directly to the establishment of a program for budget reform in Vietnam. President Ngo requested MSUG to prepare a report on budgetary administration in Vietnam frankly comparing in detail the existing system with a recommended one. The purpose of the report, according to the President, was to convince cabinet members that improved financial administration was advisable.

The report was presented to the President and the Cabinet in March 1957. Shortly after, it was distributed to many others in the government for study and comment. It was designed to stimulate attention and even controversy within the government, and in this it was successful. Neither its criticisms nor its recommendations were accepted in toto. On the other hand, most of the ideas were received with remarkable friendliness by Vietnamese officialdom. Although rebuttal was offered to a number of specific criticisms, there was surprising agreement with the authors on

the main faults of current practices and the methods which might correct them.

Within two months after the distribution of the report, the President approved a large-scale reorganization of budgeting. The Directorate of Budget, the Administration of Foreign Aid, and the pre-auditing Directorate of Obligation Control were merged into the General Directorate of Budget and Foreign Aid, directly under the President. This upgraded and strengthened the budget function. The President instructed the new general director of budget and foreign aid to begin a program of budgetary reform.

The first director—formerly administrator of foreign aid—was an excellent choice and a key factor in the progress of budget reform. A man of energy, intelligence and imagination, he saw the need for improving financial administration and had the courage and confidence to take on the job. He had been educated as an engineer and had practiced his profession for a number of years. His first governmental appointment was as director of the planning agency, from which position he was appointed administrator of foreign aid. The requirements of these positions had led him to become a serious student of economics and public finance, and he brought to his new job an understanding of the role that governmental fiscal planning and budgeting could play in the development of the country. Also, he was accustomed to working with Americans and other foreign advisers. Since he had no experience as a budget administrator, he recognized the need for assistance and turned to MSUG for it. The result was close cooperation which has led to the modernization of budgeting in the Republic of Vietnam.

The Daily Task of Reform

All the collaborators in this effort hold the same view of the *modus operandi*. As a technical adviser, I am considered by the general director and his top staff as a member of the team. I am always free to offer suggestions and my opinions are requested and considered, but the Vietnamese are responsible for instituting all reforms. The general director determines priorities and assigns specific projects to staff members. I then work closely and informally with the assigned staff, preparing staff papers, proposing procedures or models which I submit to the Vietnamese for their guidance

and use, but I do not do the job for them. Usually we develop a new procedure through a series of meetings where the Vietnamese question, modify, or reject portions of the recommendations explained. Objections are sometimes sustained, sometimes overcome. Alternatives are suggested and advantages and disadvantages pointed out. Concurrently the Vietnamese staff members prepare details of the proposals which will undergo the same process before being submitted to the general director. Never has the final product conformed precisely with the recommendations originally made. In all cases where the differences are significant I am careful to express my disagreement and the reasons to the general director and his staff. This completes my responsibility for the formulation of improvements, and the Vietnamese become fully responsible for all decisions and changes made.

After reforms have been approved and are ready to be implemented, I again offer assistance, this time in the training of personnel in the new procedures or techniques. This follow-up training is probably the most impor-

tant function of a technical adviser. It is conducted on a continuing basis, both through formally organized sessions and almost daily informal contacts with individual members of the budget staff.

Summary

It is only three years since I arrived in Vietnam, invited to advise the government on budget improvement but finding no one who wanted to listen. Using as a communication channel a committee studying a tangential topic, winning entrée to discuss budgeting with top officials by requesting their comments on a course I was to give undergraduates, and arousing the interest of second echelon budget administrators in new methods via an in-service course, we stimulated widespread discussion on budgeting. When the time was ripe, the President requested a full analysis and recommendation which led to a major reorganization, the appointment as budget director of a man willing to bring the consultant onto his team, and a regular system for continuing budget reform and education.

Language and Democracy

If the administrative economists should adopt the widespread habit of their pedagogue-colleagues to express themselves, in major policy papers as elsewhere no longer in words but in equations and mathematical symbols, administrative prerogative would be reinforced by recourse to the professional recondites. The point may be reached where neither the politically appointed executives, nor the legislators could exercise their constitutional powers, which are intended to be separate but not mutually ineffectual. This is a serious matter, since any obscurantism and any retreat from public accountability by the civil service cause distrust of people against their government, and of the legislative branch against the bureaucracy. There is no reason why the economic problems cannot be expressed in common language and every reason why they should be. There is no place in our society for what the Russian people call with resigned futility the *apparatchiks*—the technical planning specialists who operate the planned Soviet economy and are immune from questioning because they alone know the secrets.

—KARL BRANDT (Member, President's Council of Economic Advisers), "Influences of Economic Trends on Administration," *B.L.M. Management Notes*, July 1960.

A People's Watchdog Against Abuse of Power

By HENRY J. ABRAHAM

Associate Professor of Political Science
University of Pennsylvania

ONE of the significant and enigmatic problems of the governmental process in a democracy has been how best to protect the citizen against abuses of governmental power, as interpreted and exercised by its officials, high and low, civilian and military. Safeguards do exist, of course, yet they are at best limited. There are the courts, the civil servant's superiors, and the threat of political reprisal at the polls, but these are often unsatisfactory—the courts not readily accessible nor with jurisdiction over most complaints, the hierarchy often hard to reach and sometimes banded together against outsiders, and elections difficult or impossible to direct to the level of government where the abuse against the citizen commonly takes place. And the constantly expanding role of government in today's society and the increasing complexities of the governmental process have brought with them ever greater discretion on the part of a good many public officials, focusing rising attention on the need for some readily accessible, effective, knowledgeable "watch-dog" on behalf of the people.

Guarding Citizens' Rights

No such watchdog institution exists in the United States today, either on a formalized or informal basis—although, in a manner of speaking, the individual congressmen's extralegal "contact" role on receiving a constituent's complaint is somewhat similar. However, both individual legislators and congressional committees, which sometimes are thought to deserve the title of watchdog, operate on an entirely different basis both politically

» The recent establishment of central complaint bureaus in several U. S. cities perhaps indicates a growing feeling that our traditional reliance on court action against individual administrators may not be keeping abreast of the need to control administrative action. Easier avenues of complaint and redress for citizens seem needed. Six years ago, Denmark followed Sweden and Finland in establishing a "people's watchdog" against the government. Public opinion in Sweden, Brian Chapman reports in *The Profession of Government*, had come "to regard the JO almost as the Tribune of the People, a protector against the abuses of those in authority. . . ." "Recently, probably due to Dr. Chapman's book, much interest has been shown in Britain in this office," an Irish review of the book observes. As in Sweden after 150 years with a similar office, Professor Abraham reports almost unanimous approval of the new Danish *ombudsmand*.

and institutionally. Our small sister-democracy of Denmark—following, in part, examples set by her fellow Scandinavian states of Sweden (1809) and Finland (1918)—has instituted such an arrangement within the recent past and has grown to accept and cherish it as an apparatus vital to a healthy relationship between the governed and the governing. It is fair to say that, with but a few dissenting voices, the institution of the Danish *folketings ombudsmand* (Parliamentary Commissioner) has been viewed generally as a marked success—and, in the opinion of this observer-on-the-scene, justifiably so. As a result, Norway is now seriously contemplating the creation of a civilian Parliamentary Commissioner in addition to a military affairs commissioner in operation since 1952.

Denmark's 1953 Constitution called specifically for the appointment by the legislature of one or two persons, not legislators, "to control the civil and military administration of

the State." The enabling act passed on June 11, 1954 provided for just one such Commissioner. Dr. Stephan Hurwitz, Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Copenhagen, a distinguished and widely respected citizen, was elected by the Parliament and has occupied the position ever since. The Commissioner serves at the pleasure of the legislature and may hold no other public office concurrently except with Parliament's consent. But he operates independently of Parliament, subject only to its general rules. He must have had "legal education." His remuneration and allowances are high. The Commissioner reports to a special seventeen-member parliamentary committee on which all five of the parliamentary parties are represented. He submits to Parliament an annual, eagerly awaited, public report, which encompasses complete statistics of his work and histories of the cases deemed most significant by him.

The jurisdiction of the Parliamentary Commissioner extends to all phases of Danish government (a term which would include our states since Denmark is a unitary rather than a federal country), but *not* to municipal (local) governments. Prospects are good, however, that municipal administration will be included eventually, despite some strong opposition by the municipalities. Judges were kept entirely outside his range of authority in the interest of independence of the judicial process, and there is practically no chance of a change, even though Sweden's watchdog institution does cover the judiciary. In other words, the Parliamentary Commissioner's jurisdiction brackets all of the *appointed* personnel of the Danish national government other than judges as well as certain elective members of independent administrative commissions or agencies.

The Parliamentary Commissioner possesses the great power to receive a complaint or initiate an inquiry pertaining to any civil or military action performed by a civil servant of the nation. (Most cases are brought against offices or agencies, rather than persons.) In order to perform this task in a meaningful sense, he has the authority to examine, inspect, and subpoena any and all persons, documents, and minutes that he may deem necessary or desirable in the pursuit of his investigation.

A Quiet Power

Several courses of action are open to the Commissioner if he has determined that an infraction has been committed in office:

1. Where a present or former minister has committed a civil or criminal wrong, he may submit a recommendation to Parliament.
2. Where a lower-than-minister public official committed a criminal offense, he may request that the Government institute appropriate court action.
3. In the case of a simple misconduct by a civil servant, he may suggest appropriate disciplinary action.

The Commissioner does not possess the power to change an administrative action himself. In no sense of the term is he a court or a prosecutor. Nor is an administrative unit obliged to follow his recommendation fully or partially. His power has come from the highly favorable press he has generally had plus his close liaison and influence with Parliament. These combine to put tremendous pressure upon administrative authorities to accept his recommendations.

Insofar as the public record is concerned, the Commissioner's advice has always been taken. He must report any noncompliance to Parliament. There has never been any such report, nor has Parliament ever discussed one. (There is a rumor of a *sub rosa* settlement of a near-noncompliance case involving the Ministry of Ecclesiastic Affairs, but no proof exists.) Moreover, as of July 1960—after some five years of operation—the Commissioner has never had to order the authorities to institute civil or criminal prosecutions. Nor has any civil servant, threatened with an official inquiry by the Commissioner, resorted to his statutory prerogative of submitting voluntarily to a formal disciplinary inquiry by his own administrative unit. (In one case a policeman announced he would do so, but he was dissuaded by the Parliamentary Commissioner's staff.)

The Search for Justice

Only rarely has the Commissioner initiated an investigation. Normally, investigations begin with a complaint, which may come from "anyone at all" who has an "interest" in the matter. It has, however, become an unwritten rule that the Commissioner will not look with favor upon complaints submitted by persons

not directly involved unless they are supported by a responsible segment of the press. The concept of "anyone at all" covers not merely citizens outside of government service but also soldiers (from whom complaints, perhaps surprisingly, are very rare), inmates of prisons and other public institutions, and civil servants themselves, whose complaints about working conditions are a considerable part of the total.

Complaints of government employees and inmates need not be sent through channels (as those of American servicemen must, for example) but may be sent directly to the Commissioner in a sealed envelope. No superior would dare to violate this proviso, although, understandably, some do not think very highly of it. This is particularly true of some governors of state prisons, who believe that the guarantee of secrecy encourages chronic complaining. (The strongest criticism of the Commissioner the writer has encountered came from this group.) Professor Hurwitz, however, firmly believes in the desirability of that provision; he has been especially concerned with prison administration and has personally inspected a number of penal institutions during his incumbency.

All complaints must be submitted in writing, accompanied by specific evidence, and must bear the complainant's full name and address. Anonymous complaints have been rejected out of hand unless the author convinced the Parliamentary Commissioner to the contrary because of the peculiar importance of the case, a rare event.

A recent amendment to the statute requires the complainant to exhaust all of the available administrative appeals in the organizational hierarchy. The amendment was enacted for two main reasons: (a) to prevent the growth of the Commissioner's establishment into departmental size—his work load is meant to be limited—and (b) to give the administration, headed by the minister, a chance to see the complaint before it is submitted to the Commissioner. There is a time limit of one year to submit complaints, but there is no such limit on actions taken on the Commissioner's own initiative.

When complaints fall within the Commissioner's jurisdiction, he customarily calls for all relevant records, which are carefully examined by him and his remarkably small

staff. Personal, more or less informal, interviews are held in the Commissioner's office with all parties to the dispute. It has never been necessary to summon witnesses before a court of law.

A detailed letter to all concerned recites the facts, opinion, and decision. There is no appeal.

The Record

Of 1101 complaints received in 1958 (the latest available report filed in September 1959¹), 809 were dismissed, including a small number tabled, for various reasons. Fully half were outside the Commissioner's jurisdiction. For example, 109 concerned municipal authorities; others dealt with judges, legislators, and even private persons.

The remaining 292 complaints were fully investigated and decided with a minimum of delay. In most of these cases no basis for criticism of the civil servants (including members of the armed services) was found, and a careful explanation to the complainant usually put the matter at rest. In approximately one-tenth of the "handled" cases it has been necessary for the Commissioner to issue a statement of public criticism or move to recommend one or more of the courses of action outlined earlier.

Sixty-nine different government agencies were accused in the 292 cases officially handled in 1958. The largest number, 102, were against the ministries, led by 26 complaints against the Ministry of Justice and 25 against the Ministry of Finance. The police (in Denmark state-controlled) were subjected to 42 complaints; state prisons to 22; state railroads 10. There have been cases against the superintendent of state banks; the Danish steamship lines; the state insurance council; the president (*rektor*) of the University of Copenhagen; a parish priest (the Lutheran Church in Denmark is the official state church²), and the Royal Theatre.

Case of the Ballet Master

The last is an interesting case which may illustrate the handling of a complaint by the

¹ *Folketingets ombudsmands beretning for aaret 1958* (Copenhagen: A/S J. H. Schultz, 1959).

² The Parliamentary Commissioner's jurisdiction does not, however, encompass "purely spiritual" matters; it is limited to "non-spiritual" ones—not always an easy line to draw.

Parliamentary Commissioner. Early in 1951, members of the famous Royal Danish Ballet (part of the state-controlled Royal Theatre) officially complained against the conduct of its veteran ballet master, Harald Lander, partly because of his personal conduct toward female dancers, partly because of his professional direction. Exhausting then-available administrative remedies, action was instituted under the Civil Servants Act through a judge of the Court of Appeals. The judge temporarily side-stepped the professional issue but affirmatively exonerated Lander of the personal misconduct charges. The proceedings aroused enormous interest and discussion by the public, the press, and members of the Government. The Minister of Education, under whose jurisdiction the Royal Theatre falls, was heavily drawn into the dispute.

Before the investigation and disposition of the remaining charge against Lander could be completed, the embattled ballet master accepted a position at the Paris Opera. When he left Denmark without awaiting the final results of the case against him, he was officially discharged by the Minister of Education but was nevertheless granted three-fourths of the pension due him.

More than six years later, the managing director of the Royal Theatre announced that he had invited Lander (who had achieved international fame and had given a private performance in Copenhagen for the King and the Prime Minister) to guest-instruct the Theatre's *corps de ballet*. The *corps*, as well as the public, were still about evenly split for and against him. But a majority of the *corps de ballet* deemed the director's action high-handed and, failing to obtain satisfaction from the Ministry of Education, resolved to strike. Before doing so, however, the group decided to complain to the now-functioning Commissioner and to abide by his decision. Their complaint, in substance, was that the managing director had exceeded his powers in inviting Lander as a guest in the face of the past proceedings. After a thorough investigation of the entire case, the Commissioner ruled that he could find no basis for preventing Lander from any further connection with the Royal Theatre. The Commissioner readily granted that the case could give rise to anxiety among the members of the *corps de ballet*, but he concluded that "the engagement of

Harald Lander as a guest (visiting) producer by the management of the Royal Theatre is not an action which could be validly criticized by me as unreasonable towards either the *corps de ballet* or the public." All parties acquiesced in the decision—the "people's watchdog" having spoken.

Some Additional Examples

Other, more typical examples are these:

A law of 1932 requires licenses for certain types of laboratories. A civil engineer was denied a license by the Minister of Agriculture, acting upon the recommendation of one of his civil servants, on the ground that there were "already enough laboratories of that type." The applicant appealed to the Commissioner, arguing that the only ground for denial of an application under the law was a failure to meet the technical requirements regarding buildings, sanity, staff, and the manager's competence. The Ministry had admitted to him that he did meet these demands.

Held: "I personally consider it very doubtful that under the law the Ministry may withhold a license because of numbers. However, since the matter involves the Minister's interpretation of the parliamentary statute, I suggest that the point be decided by the courts, and I thus recommend. I further recommend that legal aid be granted to the complainant." (The last point underscores the Commissioner's belief that the complainant's case is strong.)

Disposition: Still pending before the Appellate Court.

Under a general statute governing administrative procedure, all ministries and their sub-agencies are required to publish all pertinent regulations and changes based upon them in the *Official Journal*. Perusing the Copenhagen newspapers one day, the Parliamentary Commissioner noticed a report of a heated verbal battle between a builder and representatives of the Ministry of Buildings and Grounds governing a new rule concerning sanitation. According to the newspaper report, which the Commissioner verified, the new rule had not been published in the *Journal*. Under his power to initiate actions himself, the Commissioner "took" the case.

Held: "In my opinion, the Ministry is in error. I suggest that it publish all rules and

regulations in accordance with the terms of the law."

Disposition: Full compliance.

The Association of High School Magazines complained to the Ministry of Education that in some schools the rector insisted on pre-censoring high school journals, and that such prior restraint constituted a violation of the constitution which states that "... everyone is entitled to print, in writing, his thoughts. . . . Censorship, and all other previous-restraint actions in this sphere are forbidden in perpetuity." The minister of education, taking note of the complaint, at first sided with the rector(s) involved, but then agreed to appoint an inspector to look into the matter. He reported that "Rectors should not censor, but must have the right to preserve order in the high schools, which may involve some form of censorship of student publications." The minister interpreted this report as upholding the rectors and rejected the complaint. The Association complained to the Parliamentary Commissioner.

Held: Though recognizing the problems, he interpreted the phraseology and spirit of the Constitution to be opposed to this kind of prior censorship and recommended that henceforth high school pupils be permitted to publish their magazines without obtaining prior approval from the Rector.

Disposition: The Ministry acquiesced.

Some other types of cases:

1. In 1958, there were more than a dozen cases in which the Parliamentary Commissioner criticized unreasonable delays on all levels of administration. This is a very typical complaint. The criticized agencies were always quick to "jump to."

2. After a complaint alleged that a public authority had shown undue favoritism for the state railway system over a presumably equally qualified private entrepreneur, the Parliamentary Commissioner's comments served to bring about a change in the authority's practices.

3. Acting on a complaint of a large newspaper (*Politiken*), the Commissioner criticized a public statement by the State Auditor considered offensive to a (now dead) citizen. The Auditor retracted his statement.

4. In 1958, acting on a citizen's complaint, the Commissioner criticized a police depart-

ment for not taking proper action against dogs which bite!

Though some of these instances might have been grounds for court action (or noncompliance by the citizen with court protection) in the U. S., a decision from the Parliamentary Commissioner is simpler to obtain, faster, and absolutely free to the complainant. There are no clerical fees and no lawyer is necessary.

Some Reasons for Success

Although a mere five years after its creation is perhaps too early to express an unqualified opinion on the merits of Denmark's Parliamentary Commissioner, there is little doubt that, on the whole, the institution has been well received by the public and a majority of the country's officialdom. Even the civil servants, whose trade union led the opposition to the idea, seem now to accept as a benefit this channel outside of channels for their grievances. It can only be termed a distinct success. The criticism that does exist is directed more to specific aspects of operation than to the institution itself.

There are several reasons for its success to date:

1. Professor Hurwitz, the first incumbent of the office, is a highly regarded, renowned, accomplished scholar and public servant, in whose appointment all political parties represented in Parliament concurred. He had made clear that he would accept the position only if he were chosen unanimously. He possesses much tact and diplomatic *savoir faire* and has proceeded with deliberate conservatism and caution (although his personal political philosophy is not necessarily conservative). The tone he has set as the initial occupant has accorded the institution the kind of acceptance and prestige that are indispensable to its successful function.

2. The Parliamentary Commissioner has assembled and maintained a small, almost tiny, well-qualified, devoted, and discreet staff of five lawyers and four typists (some of these on a part-time basis)—an almost unheard-of lowly number in the office of a major (or for that matter minor) bureaucrat.

3. The first and second points, and other factors, have combined to give him an excellent press. He is not without critics within the

Fourth Estate, however. One of the smaller but most influential journals, *Information*, has been quite critical at times for what it feels is a lack of forthright, energetic, decisively affirmative action, but, on the whole, the press has been both complimentary and encouraging.

4. The Commissioner's relations with Parliament have been excellent. An air of mutual respect and cooperation exists, and the Commissioner enjoys the confidence and support of the overwhelming majority.

5. The high morale of the average Danish civil servant has meant relatively few problems from inside the government.

6. The Commissioner has done his utmost to attain public understanding and acceptance of his office. His work has been well publicized, and he has been attentive to individual citizens. For example, all complainants except obvious "crackpots" receive prompt, full, and personal replies even if their complaint is outside of the Commissioner's jurisdiction.

7. The Commissioner has concentrated on the deterrent character of the mere presence of his office. The civil servant must face the fact that the citizen can, and does, complain. Consequently, the question of what the Commissioner would do in the event of a complaint looms large in his mind. Moreover, while once a formal complaint has been lodged with him, the Commissioner must give a formal reply, he may try to forestall the complaint by getting an advance agreement with the civil servant or agency concerned. The Commissioner also has recommended procedural and occasionally substantive reforms which might prevent future complaints.

8. Denmark is a thoroughly homogeneous

land, blessed with the absence of pronounced class distinctions, with a generally alert and well-informed electorate, conscious of the small but ancient kingdom's history and customs. Nowhere else in the world is there a higher comprehension of public affairs. Denmark suffers none of the often divisive, however natural and understandable, conflicts and problems of the huge, young, heterogeneous, frequently electorally apathetic United States. Wisdom, experience, and unity have brought with them the kind of social climate that makes possible the existence and operation of an institution such as the Parliamentary Commissioner with a minimum of mistrust and strife.

Applying the Experience to the U. S.

Differences between this country and Denmark, readily apparent in this analysis of factors in the Danish Commissioner's success, plus other differences inherent in America's body politic, make it unlikely that a Parliamentary Commissioner could succeed on the national level in the United States in the foreseeable future.³ But consideration might be given to its adoption by some of our states and municipalities. It might well engender some of the trust and goodwill that are so desperately needed today in the relationship between the governed and the governing.

³ Professor Hurwitz' own tentative proposal for a Parliamentary Commissioner system in Great Britain, now widely discussed, is that there be regional commissioners who would dispose of the majority of complaints and a head commissioner in London handling the trouble cases. An alternative suggestion is to divide the complaints by type, i.e., those against the national government, those protesting infringement of property rights, etc.

Foot in the [Back] Door Technique

For the record, it was the end of an era yesterday: after twenty-six years' service, Robert Moses retired as Commissioner of Parks. But there never was a less retiring man than Mr. Moses.

The incoming Parks Commissioner, Newbold Morris, reported that the day had brought him ten or more memorandums from Mr. Moses on specific park problems, plus a telegram.

And every day except Saturdays and Sundays since Mr. Morris' appointment was announced in mid-April, he has received ten to fifteen similar memorandums from Mr. Moses.

—PETER KIHSS, *New York Times*, May 24, 1960.

Personal Privacy—A Case of High Policy

By EDWIN W. WEBBER

*Assistant Professor of Government
College of William and Mary*

THE issue was a very simple one: the Hilltop Postal Station in Milwaukee lacked toilet enclosures adequate to assure privacy. Enclosures were prohibited by departmental regulation to prevent booths from being used for mail pilfering. Compounding the indignity, the Hilltop men's room opened directly into an eating room (called the "swing" room).

A Post Office employee, Mr. Ohm, took the complaint through two of the four steps of an established grievance process—(1) immediate superior, (2) postmaster, (3) regional office, (4) postmaster general—and then went to his congressman, Mr. Reuss,¹ who protested to the local postmaster on September 24, 1958:

... I can't imagine that this invasion of what seems an elementary right of privacy is necessary for the purposes of postal inspection.

Reuss requested that the whole matter be investigated and that "proper doors" be installed. As a side issue he wanted to know whether someone in Washington was responsible for this indignity.

The postmaster in the Milwaukee Station replied on October 1, 1958, regretting that changes would be difficult to make. In any case, he stated, the local office had no control over contracts for or construction of the building.

... The matter of toilet stalls is probably one of

¹ "I followed the first and second position but to bring this to a conclusion quickly I contacted my congressman Mr. Henry H. Reuss. We also have an association known as the National Association of Letter Carriers. They would follow the same procedure and I was the spokesman in this case locally." Letter from Mr. Ohm to the author, June 18, 1960.

» There are plenty of laughs in government, as the *Congressional Record* often demonstrates. But many will laugh at this excerpt with red faces—some from embarrassed identification with the administrators caught in a teapot tempest that whirled up to the Postmaster General, some with anger over congressional interference in a minor employee grievance, and some because a men's room is not their natural habitat.

Like most case studies, this one also gives an administrator a chance for forethought—before he, too, awakens to a nightmare in which he cannot move because a hippopotamus is standing on his little toe.

nationwide policy and would not be changed at this level.

Consequently, Reuss' letter was forwarded to the Office of the Regional Director in Minneapolis. Discussion took place between the regional director and the regional real estate officer, who had supervised the building of the postal station. They decided that the view of the toilets could most easily be blocked by rearranging the lockers located in the swing room. Reuss was notified of this recommendation by letter of November 5, 1958.

No action took place between November 1958 and January 1959, and Reuss again pressed for solution in a second letter to the Milwaukee postmaster (January 26, 1959). On February 12, 1959, the postmaster advised that the regional real estate officer

... had apparently overlooked the fact that the swing room is only 12 feet 6 inches by 18 feet 6 inches and has barely enough room to care for the two tables and necessary chairs and food vending equipment. No lockers have been placed in the swing room [doorway] and it is not possible to place any at that point without discontinuing use of the swing room for eating purposes.

The postmaster admitted that he was "in a quandary as to just what can be done with the

present physical arrangement of the building." He noted that he was reluctant to change any of the arrangements since the clerical as well as the carrier force would be affected. This reason was not explained.

Reuss then threw the problem back to Mr. Ohm, asking him to give some thought to it. Ohm responded on February 24, 1959 that he had consulted "clerical and carrier personnel" and all had concluded that the only remedy was construction of doors for the enclosures:

If the toilets had been installed on the east or west walls, no doors would be necessary, but since the toilets are the first thing that face you as you enter it is only fair and just that doors be installed. To install these doors would cost about \$5 if plywood were used.

Reuss passed this suggestion to the postmaster, who by now had thrown up his hands:

A personal visit was made to the office by the regional space requirements officer, regional real estate officer, the assistant postmaster, and general superintendent of mails. It was the considered opinion of the group that the complaint was hardly justified. . . . I believe the regional operations director has previously explained to you the reason that doors are not placed on the toilet room stalls in post office buildings. . . .

One can almost visualize the reaction of Congressman Reuss to this communication. He immediately dispatched a letter to Postmaster General Summerfield setting forth in complete detail the events leading up to the latest reply by the Milwaukee postmaster. Reuss urged that the Postmaster General act.

Apparently executive department heads concern themselves with such lowly details if a member of Congress is interested. Two days after Reuss wrote him, Summerfield replied:

Thank you for your letter of March 24 concerning proper toilet facilities at the Hilltop postal station in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

I am requesting the Bureau of Facilities to look into this situation and write you direct as promptly as possible.

On April 15, 1959, Reuss was informed by the Special Assistant to the Assistant Postmaster General that "arrangements will be made to install an L-shaped partition to provide privacy when using toilet facilities. . . ." Reuss informed Ohm of this decision for

which Ohm expressed his "heartfelt thanks," and there the matter came to a temporary rest.

But a letter from Ohm of July 10 informed Reuss, to his amazement, that nothing had been done to promulgate the April 15th decision. It also informed him that:

Some weeks ago (April) there was a man here representing the regional office and he suggested that our superintendent, Mr. Pautsch, consult with the personnel. Mr. Pautsch approached me and I suggested a partition be installed, and I also made a diagram of the kind of partition the boys would like installed, all to no avail as of this date.

Vexed at the continued delay, Reuss again wrote to Summerfield, and in a reply dated July 23, Assistant Postmaster General Rollin D. Barnard stated that the work had been completed three days earlier.

At this point the reader is tempted to conclude that something of a rapprochement had been brought about between Congress and the Post Office Department and matters would now be permitted to take their natural course. However, the invidious image of "bureaucracy" burned on, for on the same day, Ohm wrote Reuss:

Once again I must report to you on the toilet facilities at the Hilltop Station.

The partition (which is actually I-shaped and not L-shaped as specified) 30 inches wide was installed as per my diagram. When the boys look at that partition they get sick at heart and wonder just what kind of people can install such a monstrosity. I am sure that within a very short time someone will hurt his hand in opening and closing the door. When the washroom door is fully opened there is only 1 3/8 inches between the door and the partition. . . .

One gets the picture of a tired warrior as Reuss wrote to Barnard on July 28, 1959, imploring the Department to consider Ohm's new complaint. But Barnard was firm. In his reply of August 6, he flatly stated that Reuss' suggestions had been reviewed "carefully" and no reason had been found to alter policy as it pertained to the postal station. The battle was nearly over.

There was something of an anticlimax to the whole episode, however, when Reuss was invited to attend the dedication ceremony but found his work in Washington too demanding to allow his attendance. However, Ohm informed him that when the supervisors

were shown the faults of the toilet room, they said it was out of their hands and "to see the regional men." Rather than re-initiate the whole cycle of events, Reuss entered his correspondence in the *Record*. And there "rests the battle of the Hilltop Station men's room."

A Sober Look

Perhaps a few sober conclusions can be drawn without detracting from the humor of this situation.

The Post Office Department has frequently been singled out as a prime example of an overcentralized department, a condition perhaps related to the continuing close attention of Congress in its operations. Presumably some amends had been made following the Hoover Commission study of 1949, but congressional interest in Post Office affairs obviously continues to manifest itself, albeit in strange ways occasionally. Perhaps this situation points out how difficult it is for Congress to break with a tradition, or how some members of Congress delight in dressing up "an old ghost in new sheets."

It seems natural to expect a certain amount of formalism in any request, however simple. This particular instance involved a matter of some consequence to postal inspection policy, and yet it hinged on an affair so ridiculous in its pettiness as to virtually defy serious consideration. Nevertheless it was afforded all the privilege of an official congressional inquiry

with statements only slightly below the level of acrimony.

One can almost see the frustrated employee writing his congressman, asking relief from what he considered an intolerable bureaucratic situation. Whether he anticipated that his pleas would involve regional officials (including the regional space requirements officer, a splendid "bureaucratic title" certain to arouse the suspicions of a congressman) and even the Postmaster General cannot be said. His attempt to circumvent the "oppressive system" attracted many parties to the dispute. It seems probable that such occurrences as these are bound to nullify those modest degrees of success achieved by the Post Office Department in its quest for administrative autonomy.

As long as employees can seek refuge from what they calculate to be administrative incompetence by calling on individual congressmen to rescue them, the process of administrative self-reliance will suffer. This type of grievance deserves solution, but entirely within the organization, particularly as long as the formal grievance procedure has not been exhausted. Ramifying it into these proportions clearly creates more problems than were solved. At this point, administrators in the Post Office Department doubtless have their fingers crossed, hoping that no one in Congress accepts Reuss' invitation to investigate further.

Insights Out

A. B. is in charge of the management development program for a nationally known organization. We were talking about the importance of starting where the learner is in trying to help him develop or to change.

A. B. quietly added, "Of course, you can't build any kind of program unless you know what are the problems of the members of the group."

No one commented after his remark. . . . Suddenly A. B. looked up rather startled, and raising both hands to his head, almost shouted, "Oh, no! It suddenly dawns on me that for fifteen years I've been sitting behind my desk writing programs for people I've never seen. How did I know what their problems were? Why, that's terrible! I feel terribly guilty. And I'm supposed to be the expert in management development!"

A. B.'s first statement was a perfunctory repetition of an abstract idea. . . . In the second remark the idea we were talking about seeped in and seized him. Somehow he gained insight. He remade his experience.

—NATHANIEL CANTOR, *The Learning Process for Managers* (Harper & Brothers, 1958).

Reviews of Books and Documents

Book Review Advisers: Charles S. Ascher, Arthur W. Bremage, Robert L. Oshies

Light in the Shadows of the Domes

By KARL A. BOSWORTH, University of Connecticut

AMERICAN STATE POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION, by V. O. Key, Jr. Alfred A. Knopf, 1956. Pp. 289. \$4.50.

POLITICS IN THE BORDER STATES, by John H. Fenton. The Hauser Press, 1957. Pp. 230. \$5.50.

HOW THEY BECAME GOVERNOR: A STUDY OF COMPARATIVE STATE POLITICS, 1870-1950, by Joseph A. Schlesinger. Governmental Research Bureau, Michigan State University, 1957. Pp. 102.

POLITICS IN WISCONSIN, by Leon D. Epstein. The University of Wisconsin Press, 1958. Pp. 218. \$3.50.

NEW ENGLAND STATE POLITICS, by Duane Lockard. Princeton University Press, 1959. Pp. 348. \$6.00.

THE study of state politics has been greatly extended in the last several years. What was once largely a vague set of informed myths about how power is organized in state political systems has been supplemented by a considerable degree of verifiable or at least carefully assembled information. The older historical and biographical methods have been enriched by a realistic look at the organization of political power. The students of state politics have learned to get close enough to the data to talk to them, to hear what the actors in the roles of political leadership describe and admit about their own and their associates' political theories and behavior.

Statistical analyses of state election materials, while only rarely more sophisticated than trend lines, percentages, and averages, have been pursued energetically and have demonstrated that arithmetic is still a useful tool in enlightening complex phenomena. Pervading all these new analyses are theories of groupings of continuities and discontinui-

ties of human action in relation to politics—for example, persistent voting for one set of symbols until some crisis changes the pattern. A willingness to explore propositions about how men's minds are set (and changed) for political behavior helps make the assembled data of politics meaningful.

Although there is a commendable enrichment of the materials on state politics, these research reports are to some degree unsatisfactory. Most of them advance knowledge about *electoral* politics much more than they enlighten state *policy* politics. In some cases the analysis does not proceed beyond election results, contributing little to the understanding of national political systems or state policy formulation. In some cases, however, a more complete analysis of state politics is attempted or at least suggested, considering what is fought over and how. It is in these studies that the new scrutiny of state politics is becoming exciting, but even here only very rarely are the rich roles of the state bureaucrats as policy leaders even suggested.

V. O. Key's *American State Politics: An Introduction* and separately printed studies in the same vein have for several years been principal guides to researchers on state political systems. Key has a feel for the whole of the political system which allows him to explore particularities, such as the failure of parties to contest for legislative seats, and to relate such particularities to the general scene. He combines historical, statistical, theoretical, and prudential analysis of the processes and the prospects in our systems of representative government.

The historical analyses are social historical as in the studies of migration patterns of politically significant cultures and campaigns, such as those to reform the machinery and nominating process of state government. They

lead always to cautious conclusions and new questions. The statistical analyses are so simple that statisticians may smile, but all may read. Key and his followers have demonstrated that quantification in unelaborate form does measure and does emphasize politically significant comparisons, contrasts, and changes through time.

Lags in State Political Systems

Key's conclusions are not mild. He doubts that the organization of political systems in relation to state governments has kept up with the growth of state responsibilities. He thinks that the lack of development in state government-oriented political systems in combination with existing systems of "representation incapacitates the states and diverts demands for political action to Washington." (p. 267) Far from improving, "party organizations have seriously deteriorated," (p. 267) and this has occurred during the rise of the direct primary. The absence of adequate party competition, in combination with constitutional limitations on state powers and political expression, make impossible the clear protests and mandates for action that a system of popular government should provide occasionally.

These are serious indictments of the state political systems, but they are justified by the data used, particularly those related to state legislatures. I wonder, however, whether we should not also test the viability of state political systems through their policy forming processes, especially the policy maneuvering of the governor, of administrative agencies, and interest groups. For example, competition between the parties for the governorships seems to be increasing, and when governors campaign as symbols of issues, the legislators of whatever party may respond to the election returns. Of course, some gubernatorial candidates run as personalities, symbolizing nothing controversial, and as officeholders make policy to suit the day rather than symbolizing issues to voters and other officeholders.¹

¹ Eugene Burdick's, *The Ninth Wave*, a novel originally published in 1956 by Houghton Mifflin Company and now a paperback published by Dell Publishing Company, suggests the frightening possibilities of the manipulation into the governorship of a willing, dramatically skilled nonentity by a second figure whose drives are baldly for power.

However one may view Key's analysis and prediction, research summarized in *American State Politics* and the work influenced by Key, such as that of Fenton and Epstein reviewed below, have extended greatly the factual basis for the study of the states. These works are guides to research method and proposition formulation for research on state politics.

Patterns of Migration and Politics

John Fenton's study of *Politics in the Border States* is an excellent example of the combination of historical, statistical, and interviewing techniques in the study of state political systems. Fenton finds uniform patterns as well as unique elements in Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and West Virginia. He relates voting behavior to geographical background of residents—the white settlers from the plantation South forming a basis for a Bourbon faction in the Democratic party; the Negroes Republican until many switched to support the New Deal; many "small farmers, artisans, and shopkeepers" from the South now, as in the past, Jacksonian Democrats in uneasy alliance with the Bourbons; hill or mountain dwellers from the South who sided with the Union during the Civil War and have remained Republican through later generations; migrants from the North somewhat predilected toward Republicanism; and a significant number of German settlers, generally Republican. A trend toward the Republican party—interrupted by the New Deal but now continuing—is traced to increasing migration from the North.

Though the Democratic party has more steady voters in all but Maryland, the Republicans have drawn up closely enough to win when Democratic factionalism becomes crippling. The political conflict often begins with an intra-Democratic party fight between yeomen farmers and laborers against the Bourbons, followed by the general election which "is commonly a war for control of patronage and contracts rather than a conflict of interests." (p. 208)

This sharp conflict within the Democratic party produces a third Democratic force of mediating and organizing leaders who, with patronage, manipulate the primary vote in an effort to support slates which will be acceptable to the ideological wings of the party and subservient to the "organization." This phe-

nomenon was particularly noted in Kentucky and West Virginia, with governorships being key "organization" levers and the patronage-controlled vote in the more Republican areas providing the "organization's" greatest strength. In Missouri and Maryland strong city machines perform, in part, the mediating or maneuvering role that "state organizations" perform in the other two states, Fenton observes. In Missouri, a weak governorship robs that officeholder of opportunity for leadership.

Fenton sees the relative balance between the parties outside the cities resulting in an especially intense appeal by both parties to city voters who are relatively dependent employees and are expected to respond to liberal arguments. At the same time the business community is protected, in Fenton's view, by "the very positive correlation between political success and the possession of sufficient economic resources to conduct a vigorous campaign in behalf of the 'common man'." (p. 200)

Looking into the future, Fenton suggests that the Republican party will grow relative to the Democratic party and that these states will look less like the South politically. He also suggests that the political patterns now seen in the border states will move farther south with urbanization, industrialization, and further cultural mixing.

Though insightful, Fenton's view of border state politics mainly describes electoral rather than policy politics. Where statehouse politics is analyzed, it is commonly in terms of emoluments of office and patronage of jobs, supplies and contracts. Only rarely is there mention of issue politics and then without recent specifics.

The Sources of Chief Executives

Joseph A. Schlesinger's *How They Became Governor* analyzes the prior public offices held by the American state governors elected from 1870 to 1950. He found that nearly all American governors had held some prior public offices, predominantly state legislative and law enforcement positions. Many moved to the governorship through a whole series of other offices of which the most common immediately-preceding steps were statewide state elective offices (other than the governorship and law enforcement positions) and membership in Congress.

Viewed nationally, there appear to be a variety of paths to the governor's desk, but within particular states there are fairly clear career lines. A few states tend to look outside of public office for governors while others have a tendency to promote legislators, law enforcement officers, statewide elective officers, federal elective officers, or appointive administrative officers. Although holding an elective local government position is no handicap to winning the governorship of many states, it is rarely an immediate stepping stone.

Where one party is dominant and perhaps especially where there is relatively little factionalism, Schlesinger finds a pattern of advancement to the governorship through a series of partisan political posts including statewide elective positions, illustrated by New England and Iowa. Where there is little competition within and between parties, Schlesinger finds that promotion directly from legislative leadership to the governorship is not unusual, illustrated by Maine and Mississippi.

The portion of governors with law enforcement (including judicial) experience has tended to increase, particularly in some border states, Southern states, North Dakota and Pennsylvania. The author postulates convincingly (with historical references to Texas and Montana) that situations in which basic community disputes are being mediated through judicial and legal processes or where public order is threatened the judicial law enforcement roles may become politically significant. "Decisions on what to investigate and prosecute represent important political decisions. . . ." (p. 82)

Schlesinger manages generally in his brief sketches of the gubernatorial politics of seven states to convey an impression of realism with regard to the state policy issues which have influenced some elections, but the state politics sections, though useful, are supplementary to the main effort of tracing the public office careers of 995 governors.

Major Movements and Minor Figures

Leon Epstein's *Politics in Wisconsin* concentrates on the development of something like a two-party system in that state in the post-World War II period. Following surveys of the relevant social and economic setting and the political party history of the state, there follows a sophisticated analysis of the

social composition and some of the structuring of activity of the party organizations and the legislature, and an analysis of legislative elections. Wisconsin's traditions of fighting its liberal versus conservative battles in the Republican primary and of an "individualistic political tradition" emerge strongly in the findings.

Though highly intelligent and painstaking, Epstein's analysis is almost a sociological rather than a political analysis. The subjects and dynamics of state policy formation are almost obscured by the statistical and social analysis of the minor actors, such as county party leaders and legislators. Social facts are not related to political action. It would be difficult to divine from this analysis that there are major actors, such as governors and other major leaders, and the interest groups apparently have moved to Illinois and Minnesota.

In brief glances at the political system and policies, he states that local party officers claim to be concerned with state and national issues much more than with local party matters and he notes sharp contrasts in the Republican and Democratic platforms of 1954 on labor law, taxing, and spending for welfare. Also, he finds that party leadership "asserted no strong influence in the nominating process," (p. 141) and then observes that "the most significant business of each [postwar legislative] session, particularly the budget, was firmly controlled by the majority caucuses operating under party leadership" (p. 142) with no hint of the source of this power. Quarreling with an excellent book for what it does not do may seem unfair, but what is politics about and who organizes the decision processes?

The Substance of State Politics

Duane Lockard's *New England State Politics* does go beyond electoral politics to include entire state political systems as manifested in policy formation. Lockard is adept at statistical and historical analyses of political parties and the electoral processes, but his focus is on the legislative process, which compels him to locate and describe the significant groupings—political, economic or social—their leaders, and the particular issues the legislative process has been asked to handle.

New England provides a wide variety of state political systems, from Vermont's fac-

tional battles within a dominant party to Connecticut's sharply drawn contest between two highly organized parties. Lockard achieves a convincing familiarity with the party and main interest groups of each of the six states. Particular attention is given to the roles played by governors, party leaders, and interest group leaders in the legislative process.

Roughly, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont may be grouped, having less party competition, less urbanism, and less thriving economies than the other three. Yet the political system of each is quite different. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut all display party competition and industrial urbanism, but here again the patterns of political organization and policy preoccupations are somewhat varied.

New England presents a good laboratory for the study of ethnic groups in politics, and Lockard devotes a chapter to this topic. In part it is the story of the rise of the Democratic party in the region. In part it is the story of party competition for the vote of the newer nationalities and of the "ethnic" candidate. Lockard's cautious conclusion with regard to the ethnic candidate is that the "right" nationality name may draw an extra portion of votes from his nationality group but only if the candidate is politically attractive.

Lockard attempts to use the New England states to test the proposition that party competition produces more liberal policies. Distribution of the tax load, laws on certain services, and legislative effects of malapportionment were the criteria. In general the findings seem to confirm the notion that party competition is accompanied by more liberal policies. Where there is party competition, even legislatures overwhelmingly weighted toward one party by the apportionment system will accept legislation a majority of the body does not favor in preference to facing opposition party criticism. The Lockard book thus focuses on the substance of politics rather than the election returns, and this emphasis seems highly commendable.

A book not under review here but having a close relation to the subject is Coleman B. Ransone's *The Office of the Governor in the United States*.² The special point of relevance

² University of Alabama Press, 1956.

is Ransone's finding that the American governors normally come to office with some policy ideas and that the governors use their available leverages to secure compliance with these ideas, succeeding in some degree even with unfriendly legislatures. This tends to confirm the writer's impression that the governors' roles in state policy politics are more significant than some of these studies of state politics would suggest.

The Permanent Administrator-Politician

Still largely untouched in studies of state politics are the roles of the more or less permanent heads or near heads of state agencies and institutions. In many states, these are the most professional politicians of their domains. They may be conservationists, educators, engineers, medics, personnel men, or social workers by training, or they may be untrained; but if they survive in the state political system they have likely learned how to operate among interest groups, party leaders, governors, legislators, and just voters, with a high degree of skill in the organization of influence. The relative disorganization of both the executive and the party political systems in the states has given these program officers the opportunity and the need to become effective politicians. Some may be almost solely interest-group allied. Others may bargain with all influential actors on the scene. Still others may seek to develop mass support for programs. Some may be adventuresome and expansive in program development while

some seek the safety of conservative demands. In any case the survivors have a sensitivity to the location of power and skill in political adaptiveness if they do not also have capacity for leadership. If they are good administrators, they probably have leadership as well.

The political life of the state budgeteer or other management specialist also is largely unrecorded. These administrators may not have the freedom of manipulation which some program administrators enjoy, but the general management men also need to understand politics for they are parts of the political process. If they are *alter egos*, they must divine the *ego* that they are *alter* to, and he is a politician. Much of the while, as we all know, these management men must make decisions on which they can only guess their principal's views, and so it is essential to learn to think as do the politicians who are about. Management analysis in many cases operates close to the political nerves. It becomes folly if this is not recognized. The professionally trained management man may have difficulty disentangling his skills from his school-inculcated values and so run into unnecessary conflict with other politicians. Some conflict, however—even with the governor—may be essential at times. It can insert into the decision-making process reminders of values or groups otherwise neglected. But conflict, no less than cooperation, can be made more fruitful by understanding of the political leader and process, toward which these books point a short step of the way.

Government Economic Enterprises

By JOHN THURSTON, U. S. Department of Agriculture

PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY, by Lloyd D. Musolf. Harvard University Press, 1959. Pp. xii, 174. \$4.00.

PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN SWEDEN, by Douglas V. Verney. Liverpool University Press, 1959. Pp. 132. 21 s.

NATIONALISATION IN BRITAIN—THE END OF A DOGMA, by R. Kelf-Cohen. St. Martin's Press, 1959. Pp. vii, 310. \$5.50.

STAFF REPORT ON PUBLIC AUTHORITIES UNDER NEW YORK STATE, State of New York, Temporary State Commission on Coordination of State Activities. Legislative Document No. 46, 1956.

HERE are four excellent studies of the government operation of—well, what shall we call them? In large part, they are economic enterprises which a private business concern might or formerly did run. In a few cases, they

are activities that traditionally are governmental. The common denominator—and there are a few exceptions even to this—is that they provide goods or services for a price.

Musolf's book deals with accountability and control of some forty government corporations in Canada. They include such diverse activities as the Canadian National Railways, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, El Dorado Mining and Refining Limited, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Agricultural Stabilization Board, National Research Council, and the Bank of Canada.

Canada's government corporations, Musolf emphasizes, have been established wholly for pragmatic reasons, not because of theoretical or ideological considerations. For example, during the First World War the government was forced to take over certain bankrupt private railroads which then were incorporated into the Canadian National System. During the Second World War, various defense enterprises were established. Since the war, several corporations have been added to the list for the purpose of speeding development of the northern territories. Musolf feels that the story will continue. "The pace of events," he says, "still outruns the capabilities of private interests in conquering Canadian geography alone, even if business wished to devote its efforts to relatively unprofitable projects."

A number of Canadian government corporations compete or coexist with private business. This is true in railroads, telegraph, express, credit, radio and television, and aviation.

Sweden, like Canada, has decided pragmatically rather than ideologically to engage in public enterprise. Geography, control as a matter of public policy, insufficiency of private capital, and a determination to develop its resources itself rather than permit foreign capitalists to do so have been the main considerations which have led Sweden into public enterprise.

In New York State also, pragmatic considerations seem the basis for establishing public corporations—for example, to construct and operate terminals, tunnels, bridges, the New York Thruway, parking areas, and water supply, to say nothing of a planetarium and the Whiteface Mountain Ski Lift.¹ Again, the dis-

tinguishing characteristic is that the authorities provide their services for a price. This has made it possible to finance needed public improvements without increasing taxes and to avoid constitutional debt limitations. As the *Staff Report on Public Authorities Under New York State* points out, these two considerations have been important reasons for choosing the public authority form.

In Britain the story is different. Before the Second World War, a few activities of more than municipal scope were, for individual and pragmatic reasons, under public operation. When the Labour Party took office in 1945, public ownership of coal, electricity, gas, transport, and iron and steel was established in accordance with the Party's long-standing socialist philosophy. Iron and steel were denationalized when the Conservatives returned to power in 1951, as was the greater part of the trucking business.

Public Accountability and Control

How can the efficiency of government's business-type enterprises be guaranteed and how are their policies kept responsive to public needs? At least in theory, the efficiency of private enterprise can be assured by competition, and the public interest of government policy by day-to-day democratic responsibility through the machinery of government. With some exceptions, neither of these controls is applied to public business enterprises. The government enterprise usually is a monopoly of a particular service, and the regular machinery of government is considered too cumbersome for commercial-type activity.

The preferred form of organization for public enterprises financed by charges for goods or services is the government corporation, the studies indicate, but there are numerous variations fitting the tradition and government of each country. Sweden's eight trading agencies are exceptions. Providing such services as mail, telegraph, railways, and electric power, they are part of the civil service, though with day-to-day freedom from financial control because they basically operate on their own income.

But "broadly speaking the Trading Agen-

¹ United States government corporations are treated briefly but comprehensively by Harold Seidman in

37 *Public Administration* 103-14 (Summer, 1959). American corporations, Mr. Seidman points out, have been established "primarily to encourage, strengthen, and support private enterprises, not to replace them."

cies appear to belong to the nineteenth-century tradition of public enterprise operated as part of the Civil Service, while the State Companies reflect the twentieth-century concern that State enterprises should be efficiently operated on the lines of business undertakings," according to Verney. The state companies include tobacco and liquor monopolies, restaurants, credit, lotteries, iron works, and trucking, among other activities. The companies were created by the Crown under the Companies Act which governs private corporations and, like the latter, have articles of association, annual general meetings, boards of directors, and share capital. The state companies do not appear to differ basically from government corporations as established in the other three countries.

Efficiency and Honesty

Though astride a monopoly, those public corporations which can spend only what they receive in user revenue—like the Port of New York Authority—seem most likely to be managed efficiently, though profit is no guarantee of efficiency in a monopoly of course. When enterprises are government operated because they cannot get along on what they earn, even more difficult problems of efficiency control arise. Kelf-Cohen, for example, feels that failure to deal hard-headedly with the finances of nationalized industries in Britain and uncritical readiness to advance funds for development have led to unrealistic attitudes and policies.

With the usual business-enterprise yardstick twisted by subsidy, questions of control of personnel systems, administrative procedures, and finances are raised. Swedish trading agencies and a few New York State enterprises are under civil service, for example, but even this partial control is now questioned by many in Sweden, and the newer state companies appear freer of public control than seems acceptable in English-speaking countries.

Policy Control

No generally satisfactory formula of accountability and control has evolved, and many members of present-day legislative bodies are dissatisfied with their inability to obtain an accounting when some unsatisfactory event occurs in a publicly-operated en-

terprise. The New York Commission staff, too, believes there is a lack of public information in some matters.

In the parliamentary countries, a minister is usually responsible for each enterprise. It is not clear, however, just what his responsibility is or how far it extends. Informal consultation between the enterprise on one side and the minister and his senior civil servants on the other appears to be of considerable influence. Almost never are instructions given publicly by a minister to a corporation. In Great Britain, the corporation must lay before the appropriate minister from time to time general programs of capital development, education, training, and research. Because of the need for financial support from the government, programs of capital development have been submitted annually. In practice, it seems clear that corporations in the various countries have received varying degrees of attention from the executive, some getting a great deal and others little, if any.

Ministers tend to refuse to answer questions raised in parliament relating to day-to-day operations. There is lack of systematic provision for review by the legislature of the policies, finances, and results of public operation. Musolf thinks that parliamentary committees offer a good means of maintaining public accountability and of keeping Parliament informed. In Britain a select committee of the House of Commons has been appointed after a great deal of debate and considerable uncertainty as to what matters relating to government corporations the committee should consider. Kelf-Cohen feels that Parliament denied itself the right of direct oversight by the provisions of the acts creating the corporations. He therefore regards the creation of the select committee as improper. In any case, he thinks, real control rests with the ministers through informal consultation, for which they cannot in practice be held responsible by Parliament.

In the case of the Swedish trading agencies, Parliament has direct power through consideration of requests for capital funds and review of accounts. With the state companies, Parliament has no direct control nor can it hold individual ministers responsible in the same manner as in Great Britain and Canada. This situation has led to considerable discussion of the whole question of accountability.

We may be sure that whatever system of controls is adopted, it will evolve from the experience and thinking in each individual country. There is not necessarily a universal optimum pattern which all countries ultimately will come to adopt. The degree of independence of a public enterprise will depend, among other things, upon the degree to which its operations are related to questions of public policy. In a great nationalized industry, such as coal or electricity in Great Britain, questions of development and expansion are bound to be matters of public policy. An activity which is subsidized is likely to be controlled more strictly than one which is not. In some—perhaps a considerable number—of public enterprises of smaller scope, it is conceivable that functions and policies may be defined and the enterprise left relatively free to operate very much in the same manner as a business concern. The amount of freedom which can be allowed probably depends in considerable degree upon the level of political morality attained in any country, for operation of public enterprises does afford opportunity for favoritism and misuse of power.

Even in cases where the corporation is given considerable freedom, it is desirable that the legislature be informed about the agency's operations, policies, and problems. I do not share Kelf-Cohen's opposition to the use of select committees which may obtain information and raise questions about the operations of a corporation. Perhaps I am influenced by congressional procedure in the United States. At any rate, I can think of a considerable number of instances in which congressional inquiry proved to be a healthy and stimulating thing. Inquiry by a parliamentary committee does not seem to me incompatible, as a practical matter, with ministerial responsibility.

Control via Boards of Directors

A measure of public control is exercised via boards of directors. The most common type of management is a board appointed by the government, meeting from time to time in the same manner and to perform the same functions of policy-making, approval of plans and finances, and review of operations as the board of directors of a private corporation. In some cases, the chairman is the chief executive officer and serves full time. A few corporations

have full-time boards. As Musolf notes, this tends to be a difficult arrangement in practice, the main problem being how to achieve coordination of action among the various areas for which the individual directors are responsible.

In the nationalized industries in Britain, the boards serve full time. This may be necessary in a major industry of national scope. However, Kelf-Cohen notes considerable difficulty, both on the score of coordination and in attracting men of high ability at salaries considerably less than is paid to top men in private industries. The latter problem is one which leads him to take a pessimistic attitude toward the operation of the nationalized industries.

Not all directors are appointed by the government. For example, in four of the Swedish state companies, there are minority private shareholders. In three of these, the private shares are three per cent or less of the total, but the private shareholders elect half of the directors. In most of the remaining twenty-one companies the Crown holds all the shares but still goes through the formality of electing the directors at an annual meeting. Seven companies are subsidiaries of trading agencies.

Management and Policy Audits

As one means of control, it seems to me that it would be very desirable if once every four or five years a careful review of operations and management of each government corporation were made by able and qualified persons, and at longer intervals a review of each corporation's policies and objectives and their relation to government policies. At least in the area of management, I am sure that we know enough and have available enough qualified people so that we could come to a pretty clear conclusion as to how good a job each corporation is doing. Such reviews would help to stimulate and maintain vitality—a matter of great importance in any organization. Reports of these reviews should be made available to the executive, the legislature, and the public.

Flexibility for Line Agencies

The freedom from many regular government procedures which is commonly given to public enterprises results from necessity. A busi-

ness must be able to act quickly if it is to give any sort of satisfactory service to its customers.

Now, to what extent would it be desirable to extend similar freedom to regular government operations? Here again, each country is going to think through such matters for itself and certainly will not adopt any common or universal pattern. It may well be, however, that the practices of government corporations, if they prove to be efficient and honest, will have an influence on government administration.

Let us look at personnel administration. In the Winter, 1960, *Review*, Professor Sorauf wrote that patronage in public employment in the United States is slowly dying out. To the extent that this is true, it would seem that some of the civil service restrictions to protect against patronage might be relaxed. Government corporation experience also suggests that greater flexibility might be allowed in salary schedules, either in particular occupations or across the board. At the same time, it must be understood that many of the personnel practices employed in government, such as selection tests, position classification, and formal salary and retirement plans, are a necessity in any large administrative organization. The major possibilities for change probably lie in the direction of greater flexibility and adaptation of rules and procedures to the particular needs of different types of government activities.

In recent years, we have seen accounting and auditing improvements of great importance in the United States government. These changes have been mainly the elimination of procedures which did not accomplish anything of real value and making accounting and auditing more useful management tools. The example of government corporations can

stimulate us to inquire further in these directions and to try to adapt financial procedures to each type of government operation. For example, would there not be value in adoption by the legislature of five- or ten-year plans and budgets for such programs as research or hospital construction even if funds are appropriated annually?

Still another leaf from the experience of government corporations can be taken in the field of law. We might ask, for example, whether regular government agencies should not be liable in tort, as government corporations usually are.

Finally, we may note the value of bringing in as members of boards of directors of government corporations, or as official advisers to such boards, able men from private life who would ordinarily not accept full-time government employment but who are willing to contribute their judgment and ideas toward the success of the corporation's operations. In certain respects, this is done through advisory committees, as well as through part-time committees of farmers in the administration of some of our farm programs. There is great value in using the best minds in private life to advise on government operations. At the same time, there is also an educational value in letting these advisers become familiar with government activities, policy, and administrative problems.

There is always a tendency to follow existing practices and, to be sure, a sense of stability is needed in public administration as in all human activities. But, at the same time, there is need for adaptability and continuing improvement, and it is here that comparison of the administration of public enterprise activities with regular government operations can be extremely valuable.

By Land or By C

By HERBERT JACOB, Tulane University

AREA AND POWER: A THEORY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, edited by Arthur Maass. The Free Press, 1959. Pp. 224. \$5.00.

ONE of the classical riddles of political science is how to establish an effective—and yet a controllable—government. The answer

has always been to divide governmental power in such a way that effectiveness would be maintained while the danger of an accumulation of arbitrary power would be avoided. Maass and his collaborators now return to this problem with some of the modern tools

of political analysis. Their volume, however, unhappily illustrates the dangers of superficially using a variety of approaches without a systematic exploitation of a single method. The result is a sprinkling of useful insights, an example of unfruitful scientism, and a repetition of well known problems of American federalism.

In his introductory essay, Harvard professor of government Arthur Maass points to two methods of dividing power—first within the capital (e.g., separation of powers and organization of federal programs into departments and subagencies) and second, among different areas (e.g., the establishment of such geographical units of government as states, counties, and cities). Both capital and areal divisions of power (abbreviated to *cdp* and *adp*) can in turn be divided into groups reminiscent of Gulick's principles of organization: by process, function, or constituency.

Maass rightly insists that the division of governmental power may be instrumental in attaining the goals of an administration. Federal-state relationships are not problems of administrative nor legal technique alone; they involve the fulfillment of political values. In fact Maass postulates the expansion of liberty, equality, and welfare as the goals of *adp*. He suggests that a greater amount of *adp* than *cdp* is necessary for the optimum achievement of these values.

This hypothesis shows the gaps in Maass' theory, for he has suggested no way to determine whether one institutional structure has more or less *adp* than another. Moreover, by using such global terms as "liberty," "equality," and "welfare," he obscures the operation of his model, for all of us know the infinite varieties of meaning which these terms may denote. Finally, by stating the problem in these vague terms, he robs his theory of its ability to suggest fruitful paths for further exploration. Both the practitioner and research worker will be puzzled by their inability to fit experiences or observations into one of his categories and come to insightful conclusions.

The essays by Stanley Hoffmann and Samuel P. Huntington on how French and American political philosophers have viewed *adp* reveal an interesting contrast to Maass' theory. Differences among the founding fathers, particularly Adams and Jefferson, reveal the close ties between preferences for different divisions

of power and preferences for one of the values—liberty, equality or welfare—over the others. Although these earlier thinkers could draw only on common sense observations, they provided the conceptual foundation upon which the American federal system was established.

Some Practical Guides

Paul Ylvisaker takes a more practical approach. He formulates five maxims to guide government reformers in establishing a division of powers which will produce the best blend of liberty, equality, and welfare for the U.S. Ylvisaker's first maxim specifies that all government units should have the *general* "power to govern." All levels should share all powers with two exceptions, foreign and defense affairs. Allocating powers exclusively to one level or another implies distinctions which are not, in fact, absolute but only relative or not distinctions at all. Also, such allocation inhibits the citizen from participation in government as a whole person.

Second, Ylvisaker suggests that the optimum number of levels among which to share power is three, though the middle layer chronically suffers from lack of vitality and efficiency. But two levels invite "abiding conflict . . . or subordination . . ." and, as proof of their inefficiency, "two-level systems seem naturally to progress toward the establishment of a middle level." But he offers only intuition as argument against more than three tiers.

Third, each governmental level should include a diversity of interests to insure effective debate and to provide links with other areas and higher levels of government. For instance, no government should be based exclusively on a cotton economy which would provide no foundation for an active minority within it or a bond to outside areas with no interest in cotton. He argues that governmental boundaries probably should not follow natural social boundaries.

Fourth, each area should not be directly represented in the legislatures of higher levels, else parochialism would be promoted.

Fifth, the system should provide channels to regulate intergovernmental relations. There should be established procedures to enable areas to work alone, to promote cooperation, to settle intergovernmental disputes, and to provide a change in the system.

These maxims perhaps overreach the extent of our systematic knowledge of the consequences of the areal division of power. However, they clearly point to testable propositions for the researcher and afford provisional guideposts for the administrator who must promote efficient administration of intergovernmental programs.

Cases in the Light of Theory

The case studies report the consequences of areal division of power in three contexts: Robert C. Wood describes the woes of metropolitan areas, York Willbern analyzes the prospects of state government, and J. Stephan Dupré tells us how our Canadian neighbors approach problems which we often think belong exclusively to the United States. Especially Wood offers novel conclusions as a result of applying some of Ylvisaker's maxims. He notes that metropolitan reformers have lost sight of the general power to govern. The special districts which they have established (for water distribution, sewage disposal, and park systems) lack constituents for whom these services may be translated into political issues. With the removal of increasingly larger fragments of municipal services from politics, metropolitan government has become irresponsible. Nobody knows what is going on, and even if they knew, they would possess no direct channel to correct corruption and inefficiency. Wood, therefore, argues for new

metropolitan governments which fulfill at least two of Ylvisaker's criteria. They should have general, as opposed to limited, functions; they should encourage debate and grass roots participation. He suggests that a beginning may be made by combining all transportation services—highways as well as rapid transit—into one metropolitan unit responsible to the people, for transportation is a function which affects the entire metropolis in a manner that will evoke discussion, debate—and hopefully, the democratic process.

In an appendix, the editor reprints an essay by H. G. Wells on the growing pains of modern municipalities; it clearly shows that these problems are by no means novel.

The authors of this volume have reopened an important area of political analysis that may have vast practical consequences. But this volume is only a beginning. The problems which Maass raises require more rigorous analysis than he has initiated here. The book still leaves us short of a conceptual framework that will direct research to the crucial questions that confront us. We need facts that are informed by theory. All of the case studies suffer not only from their brevity but also from lack of an intensive analysis based on theoretical foundations. Although administrators will find some novel and useful observations about the operation of a federal system in this volume, it offers no substitute for their own rules of the thumb.

The Practical Administrator

By ERWIN W. BARD, Brooklyn College

THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION, by C. H. Sisson. Faber and Faber Ltd., 1959. Pp. 162. 21s (or \$4.50 from British Book Service, New York).

MR. SISSON is an assistant secretary in the British Ministry of Labor, and thus a member of the administrative class in the civil service. In *The Spirit of British Administration* he has given us a vigorous and provocative little book, one to be added to the very few on comparative public administration. It takes its place with Brian Chapman's *The*

Profession of Government but deals less with the institutions and process of administration and more with the elusive qualities that shape administrative thinking and behavior in various countries. These books are rare indeed. Frank Dunnill's *The Civil Service: Some Human Aspects* has some of this quality but deals only with Great Britain.

A respite from the daily demands of office enabling Mr. Sisson to write this book was made possible by the grant of a Simon Senior Research Fellowship in the University of Manchester. The practitioners of public adminis-

tration can be grateful that some of their American colleagues are also accepting the challenge of similar opportunities at our own universities.

Wisdom and understanding are said to emerge from the discovery and study of differences. Sisson has compared the European continental systems of administration (and, in passing, the American) with his own and has commented sharply on the differences. He does not like French administrative law any more than Dicey did more than a half century ago, but for a totally different reason: it hampers the power of government. "The progress of the *Conseil d'Etat*, in certain directions, has," he says, "proceeded *pari passu* with the decline of the French state." For the French *préfet*, in his role as regional governor, Sisson has a large amount of distrust, if not scorn. As for his role as regional coordinator, "he cannot do anything that representatives of the Ministries, agreeing among themselves could not do." German efforts at decentralized administration through the *Laender* are criticized for their tendency to escape ministerial, hence parliamentary control. The Swedish system puzzles him since it differs so much from the British. Yet Sisson finds himself at home in it, a fact which he attributes to a "certain kinship in the sober and practical turn of mind in which the Swedes approach their affairs." This gives rise to his suggestion that perhaps administrative devices are basically unimportant "compared with what one might call the temper of administration." If Sisson's efforts at comparison seem to serve largely to confirm his own predilections, the illumination they throw on the odd insularity of British administrative thinking is a net gain for the reader.

The criteria of merit in administration that Sisson applies are those established, although he does not clearly avow it, by that peculiar set of demands made upon Whitehall by the parliamentary system as it operates in Westminster. And what Sisson says about governmental administrators in general must be understood to relate mainly, if not exclusively, to the British administrative class with its unique relationship to the ministers of the Crown.

Image of the Administrator

"It is the absolute non-entity of the British administrator that is his chief merit." He has

"no need . . . to be a man of ideas"; in fact, he "should learn to discount his own opinions." While it is a commonly accepted democratic principle that, in a broad sense, an administrator is "the instrument of wills not his own"; yet few outside of Britain would agree with Sisson that "his characteristic stance must be that of the man not concerned as to what is to be done, but only that what is done shall be acceptable."

To understand why Sisson attributes merit to this image of the administrator one must note how it fits with his views on government:

The essential character of government, and so of administration by which it is effective, is a process of maintaining the unity of the political group.

Professor Mackenzie explains in the foreword that

for Mr. Sisson to govern is primarily to adjust; to maintain unity in a society by avoiding choices which in their nature must be divisive, and in the end cumulatively destructive.

If one were to protest that governing is deciding and deciding is choosing, which requires recognition, perhaps even accentuation, of divisions, Sisson would probably reply that to decide is the role of the minister, not of the administrator.

It is not for the administrator to be concerned with the politics of a measure, certainly not in the party sense, perhaps not even in the sense of social values, says Sisson. But "he has daily cause to be even agonizingly aware of the practicality of the thing." His is not the discipline of truth but only the search for "what is necessary, at a particular time, to help his minister to ride the wave of criticism in the House." The administrator is one who specializes "in the awareness of ministerial responsibility."

Rigorous ministerial responsibility, stabilized by a disciplined parliamentary majority, has long been recognized as the outstanding feature of British government. It has also been noted that this discipline submerges the political pluralism of pressure group activity so evident in the United States. Administrative pluralism, it appears from Sisson's analysis, is equally incompatible with ministerial responsibility. There can be no independent views publicly maintained among administrators. Their role is that of advisers on the practical

ity—i.e., the consequences—of measures espoused by the ministers.

"Centralization is the logic of any administrative system as such; it is also and forcibly, in the logic of parliamentary democracy."

The best training for the role of administrator so defined, in Sisson's opinion, is "to learn by doing—like riding a bicycle." Indeed, "the British administrator travelling abroad is shocked to discover that many countries are administered by men who read books about public administration . . . a very unfortunate state of affairs."

Law and Administration

In a country where "the administrator who plans the content of legislation . . . is normally also the man who . . . will be responsible for seeing that the machinery set up works properly," it is not strange to find a somewhat different attitude toward the law than in our own. The British administrator,

according to Sisson, resists the notion of control by law. He will "avoid law-making when he can." He resents the "damage which may be done to the administration by the inept intrusion of the law" and "likes to see the law growing out of practice and crowning it."

Such vast claims for administrative discretion are startling in themselves and more so coming from an official in a land which we have traditionally associated with the rule of law. In lieu of control by law, Sisson finds that the British administrator "enjoys a much more supple and subtle form of control. The control with us is that provided by public opinion and particularly public opinion as expressed through Members of Parliament."

If this kind of control really does exist, there is one indispensable ingredient: a group of policy technicians functioning between the parliamentary ministers and administrative operations in the manner of the British administrative class as Mr. Sisson portrays it.

Action in a Flash

In 1943, as Commissioner of the Federal Public Housing Authority, I inspected the last prewar permanent low rent housing project which was about ready for occupancy (by workers in essential war industries). Jasper McLevy, longtime Socialist mayor of Bridgeport, and I were taken by the officers of the Bridgeport Housing Authority to the subterranean cellars of the project; and I went quietly. When we got to the boiler room, Mayor McLevy, who had no safety valve, exploded. The ghastly red tape of the war priority system, he bellowed, had delayed for months the delivery of the proper fittings for the heating plant whose metal parts were laying about uselessly and conspicuously unassembled on the basement floor. Winter was coming, the building was otherwise ready for occupancy but there was no way to supply heat or water. In the midst of the Mayor's tirade several photographers appeared, as it seemed from inside the boilers, and the room was brilliantly illuminated with flash bulbs.

Next morning the Bridgeport newspapers had front page photographs of your ambushed and disconcerted commissioner from Washington, surrounded by unassembled, unfinished boiler components and with His Honor, the Mayor of Bridgeport, pointing an accusing finger at him like the prophet of yore. There was no doubt left in the public mind of the vigilance of the local government and the inefficiency and incompetence of the Washington bureaucrats.

Bridgeport's housing project received and assembled its missing boiler components within thirty days.

—HERBERT EMMERICH, Consultant in Public Administration, United Nations Technical Assistance Administration.

Developments in Public Administration

Compiled by WILLIAM B. SHORE

*Publications Officer
American Society for Public Administration*

Management Consultants: Traditional and Nondirective

"With the great increase in the use of consultants by groups and organizations, there is a need to assess the process of consultation and the use of the professional helper within such a process." This observation by a behavioral scientist and consultant is part of a symposium aimed at building a research base to study consulting. Now, one of the articles states, there is a very lean and scattered literature. (15 *Journal of Social Issues* No. 2 (1959). Nearly all of the contributors to the symposium have been affiliated with a group-dynamics training or research institution and doubtless are more sensitive to the human relations within organizations and more inclined to be nondirective in their consulting work than other behavioral scientists might be. In the management cases described, the approaches were basically nondirective.)

Quite different assessments of consultant roles and skills were made recently by more traditional management consultant groups—the Association of Consulting Management Engineers (*Professional Practices in Management Consulting*, published by the Association, 1959) and the Agency Management Analysis Officers' Group of the United States government—in effect, consultants to outside units though within their own departments ("The General Management Analyst," published by the Group, 1960).

Basic Differences

Basically, the difference between the nondirective and the traditional approach—to those types of cases which either might take on, recognizing that the traditional consultant has other types of jobs also—seems to be this:

The traditional management consultants describe their role much like a physician's. There is a complaint which the consultant diagnoses and for which he prescribes a cure. Sometimes, but not always, he involves the patient in the diagnosis and sometimes, but not always, he assists the patient in applying the cure. But (again like the physician?) the process by which the patient uses the prescription to effect a change in himself is of secondary concern. In the ACME book, for example, only about a half-dozen of nearly 100 pages refer to any aspect of the process of change. Similarly in the federal management analysts' booklet.

On the other hand, these behavioral scientists concentrate on the *process* of effecting change and seem to be demonstrating that the process may produce more significant effects than the solution to the immediate problem. Further, the solutions are simultaneously developed and installed. These analysts look primarily at personal relations, trying to help the client organization improve the immediate informal organization and, for the future, trying to help all the participants improve their human relations skills—in contrast to presenting a set of recommendations for the client to follow. Two examples illustrate.

Two Cases of Nondirective Consultation

In one case, personal relationships at the top of a small firm (about 200 employees) became frayed. The management difficulties were fairly typical of those for which any management consultant might be hired: poor delegation, poor headquarters-field and top management-middle management communication both up and down, overly-flexible personnel policies, and competitive rather than

cooperative relations between the president and a key vice president. Presumably, one could draw up a new organization chart, personnel policy statement, and communication system that would improve the situation. But here the consultant did not.

First, he felt it necessary to analyze his own relationship to the client organization. Second, he found that the problem lay mainly in the informal relations rather than in the formal organization. He described it as "a learning problem." The management personnel, he felt, needed to learn how to diagnose situations better, how to behave differently, and how to see more clearly the effects of their own behavior on their colleagues. But the consultant did not see his job as simply presenting the client with "appropriate and correct information about feelings in the situation." He went on "to help create a training or learning situation in which those concerned could . . . look back at this information and work jointly on ways of dealing with it."

After the consultants had collected all of the managers' views on the situation and reported them to the president and then to several groups of top managers, the whole management group met for a three-day workshop, first going over the various views of the situation described by all of them, then discussing organization behavior theory with the consultants, and then beginning to identify and work on their own problems.

The group quickly selected one problem to begin: the overprotection of a manager by his superior. Though the revelation of the executive's behavior (brought home to him by noting things he had just been doing at the conference) was a shock to him, he weathered it and used the new insight, the author says. This procedure was continued with other problems. Department staffs even submitted their program ideas for comment by all the departments. Finally, units met separately to decide how their new insights could be brought back to the shop.

After a few months, and some observed progress toward improved relations, the consultant was again invited to guide the firm. Now, with insights on personal relations improved—"the giving and accepting of feedback had been developed as a group standard"—the group itself took action which an

outside management consultant might have done for it in the first place: revision of job descriptions of some managers, setting up a study of wages and salaries, and arranging new communication procedures between junior and senior managers. Even this stage the consultant saw as "learning to solve problems better," not as end-product.

A second case, in addition to further illustrating the nondirective consultant's method, illustrates the authors' argument that human relations within an organization are more likely to be improved by consultation to the whole organization than by training individuals or relatively small groups from the organization. Even if individual insights and behavior are changed by a training program, "more often than not the individual change is not supported after return to the staff situation and previous patterns of behavior are soon in evidence. The assumption that individual change can lead to organizational change is rarely warranted for this type of training." By working with the whole group, members' interaction rather than one member's action is the focus, eliminating a typical reaction to a training course:

This was a wonderful experience, and it's too bad my boss couldn't have been here because he's the one who really needs this.

The Role of the Consultant-Trainer

If, essentially, the organization solves its own problems, what does the "consultant-trainer" contribute? In this article's view, he (1) operates the training program in a neutral way, with "a problem-solving rather than an evaluative attitude," which those involved could not easily do; (2) changes the atmosphere from the usual job situation with its superior-subordinate relations to an unusual situation in which all ranks are working on a common problem; (3) takes the initiative in exploring subjects usually seen as taboo and sees—what participants sometimes cannot see—the moment when both parties in a conflict are ready to move toward a solution (for example, even when the boss "had expressed a desire to receive some feedback," and subordinates wanted to feed it to him, "neither was able to initiate this type of discussion . . ."); (4) helps participants get over the negative-experiences in change as change develops and helps them meet unforeseen problems

which may result from the change. His fundamental expertness is creating a learning situation.

A Problem Avoided

The nondirective management consultant avoids what may be a major problem of the more typical consultant: that, in ACME's words, he "must contend with . . . being looked upon as . . . an 'expert' retained to tell men of some experience how to do their work more effectively." The nondirective consultant brings entirely different expertness to the situation than do the members of the client organization, and they end up solving the problems within their own field of expertness.

However, resistance to accepting the traditional consultant's advice may not be a serious problem in business firms. ACME suggests that the top man can take measures "to smooth the way," including "visible support at the top level; a single, strong liaison point through which the consultant can obtain assistance; and the advance indoctrination of the client's personnel concerning the objectives of the work being done, its relationship to their job assignments, and the importance of co-operation." (Notice the authoritarian language in contrast to the tone of the nondirective consultant.) And apparently it works. John Corson, who has been a management consultant to both government and industry, told the Jackson Subcommittee recently:

In private business, after you have made an analysis, it is easier to go to the president and get action. He has greater freedom to decide, "Yes, this we will do and we will start tomorrow," than does the head of a Federal agency. (Hearings, Part III, p. 541.)

But Several New Problems To Face

On the other hand, the nondirective consultants have problems which other management consultants do not seem to have, judging from the publications here.

Being this kind of "professional helper implies responsibility for a high level of self-awareness about one's own values and needs as they may influence the helping relationship." The traditional management analyst, on the other hand, seems to share with his client the same value system within the terms

on which he will work. At least this kind of self-awareness does not seem to him essential. Similarly, the behavioral scientists raise as a problem the question of whether it is right for the consultant to take the initiative to intervene in a group "with attempts to give help." To the management analyst in the federal government there is no problem. One of his "required skills" is the "stimulation of management improvement" and concern about the morality of intervention seems irrelevant to the kind of situation he sees and the way he intervenes. Likewise the traditional consultant seems to have no problem with objectives. ACME says with confidence, "General objectives will have been established during the negotiations." The behavioral scientist, on the other hand, raises as a major question: ". . . Does the consultant formulate goals for change in the client, or does he work only in terms of goals formulated by the client?"

Another problem that concerns the nondirective consultant but that does not seem to bother other management analysts is avoiding dependence of the client on the consultant. The traditional management analyst and his client, apparently, do not feel their psyches will become entangled and so see no more danger of serious dependency than with the provider of any other temporary service to the client.

Professional and Executive Manpower Planning

In the next decade, "the biggest increases [in U.S. manpower needs] will occur in occupations requiring the most education and training," the U.S. Department of Labor warns. And government manpower needs will be growing faster than the rise in total employment. ("Manpower—Challenge of the 1960's," U.S. Department of Labor, 1960.)

² In fact, the trend has long since begun. For example, in the 1947-57 decade, 90 per cent of the increase in manufacturing employment in this country was in nonproduction workers—executive, professional and technical. Based on a recent study of personnel changes in forty-seven firms somewhat representative of American industry, the Director of Princeton's Industrial Relations Section has made

these observations: Already businesses are competing for top managers. Changes underway and planned will further increase the demand for highly-trained personnel. Nevertheless, there is no "serious attempt to translate these plans into terms of the human resources needed to carry them out." Furthermore, "the greater employment of brainpower in industry will demand smarter and much more thoroughly and broadly-trained top executives." "All along the line, greater emphasis needs to be placed on forward manpower planning," he concludes. (Frederick Harbison, "Manpower and Innovation: Some Pointers for Management," 36 *Personnel* 8-16 (November-December, 1959).)

Two other possible indications of shortage and future shortage of professionals: From 1954 to 1959, the number of firms using outside agencies to recruit executives increased from 172 to 770, according to the Association of Executive Recruiting Consultants. Second, the number of registrants in engineering colleges in 1959 dropped for the second successive year after steady rises earlier in the decade.

The Federal Executive Branch Plans

In February, the President reminded all executive agencies that in the coming decade, two-thirds of the 751 top career officials (GS-16, 17, and 18) in the federal government would be eligible for retirement; that by the end of 1963, two in five would be. To replace them, he wrote, "employees with executive potential in positions below the top career levels must be identified, trained and developed over a period of time to increase their capacity to perform the complex functions of career managers." His special assistant for personnel management was asked to guide a governmentwide program to do this. Shortly after, the Civil Service Commission set up an Office of Career Development reporting to the executive director which will inventory career executive personnel for a central recruiting and placement service to help agencies locate executive and professional personnel and which brings together the Commission's interagency training and career planning activities.

A further step, the establishment of an administrative staff college to develop top career executives, was strongly recommended by the

chairman of the Civil Service Commission to "keep senior career officers alert and growing," "make them better fitted for transfer," "hopefully . . . help to keep them in Government for a full 30-year career," "give them perspective on some of the more important issues facing the nation and the world" and on the impact of these issues on their work, fill in gaps in their knowledge of history, add to their skills, and give them "the incentive to try the new and the challenging." (Roger W. Jones, "Why We Need a Federal Administrative Civilian Staff College Now," 76 *Good Government* 46 (November-December, 1959).)

The Jackson Subcommittee Inquires

The Jackson subcommittee heard three days of testimony on "Mobilizing Talent for Government Service." (Hearings, Part III, Government Printing Office, 1960.) In seeking ways to assure (in the chairman's words) "the country's 'best brains' to man key posts at home and abroad," both political and career, the subcommittee wandered from the more obvious questions of salaries, prestige of government work, and central recruiting of political executives to conflict of interest rules, the proper share of responsibility between career and political executives, contracting with non-governmental organizations, legislative-executive relations, distinctions between politics of policy and politics of party, the impact of loyalty-security publicity, firing procedures in the federal government, congressional salaries, representation of special interests in the government, and transition of administrations—and all were directly related to the issue.

The main block to obtaining outstanding political executive talent, according to the businessmen witnesses, is that the middle years, when an executive seems to have the greatest dynamism and ability, are precisely the years when in his own firm "the decision is finally made as to how far the fellow is going. And it is a bad time to be away," as the president of Du Pont emphasized. There was general agreement that conflict-of-interest laws should be eased for political executives and that salaries should be raised some and retirement provided in some way for the short-term political executive. Yale Law Professor Bayless Manning asserted that the executive in middle years could not afford a stint in Washington. He also argued, on the other

side, that "when government service offers . . . a challenge and opportunity to do something [worth while], many of its personnel recruitment problems quietly go away." But several witnesses felt there was little hope that any but the young or old in business would stay in Washington more than a year or two. The young were too inexperienced. The old, who had reached the top in their own firms, found it difficult to take second or third place in a government agency and furthermore often did not have the flexibility or energy needed.

Three proposals aimed at mitigating the problem of obtaining the talent of middle-years executives: an internship for young business executives which would somewhat prepare them for later service in Washington, reducing the period of preparation for effectiveness which testimony generally put at eighteen months to two years (though one witness was skeptical that the lesson would carry over that long); more contracting of government programs to take advantage of business executives' talent without moving them from their own home and career slot (though one witness and the chairman were concerned about getting the government men who could make the proposals of contractors into policies and check contractors' actions); and convincing business people that government service is broadening to the individual and helpful to the firm (though Du Pont President Greenewalt was not sure it would help the middle-aged man catch his trapeze).

To ease what was identified as one of the major barriers to obtaining businessmen of all ages, some of the committee members suggested that one congressional committee take the responsibility for counteracting the bad publicity caused by criticism of political executives by other congressional committees. On the other hand, several witnesses observed that the political executive cannot expect to live in a protected world and must be ready to enter politics when he accepts such an appointment. A longtime career man, Civil Service Commission chairman Roger Jones, gave the committee a lesson in political parties. Not only must the parties search out their best talent for these positions, but they must teach appointees "an understanding of what the party stands for" and that they should be

"loyal lieutenants of the President" not spokesmen for special interests. Unlike "the Cabinet and the sub-Cabinet offices . . . up to about the time of World War I," political executives of today are not very partisan, he commented. ". . . By and large our so-called political officers today are not politicians in the whole sense of the word . . . who have dedicated their lives to participation in the political process. . . . Many of them have never run for elective office" or held party positions. At least a dozen sub-Cabinet appointees have complained to him that their superiors try to get them to be more partisan than they wish to be, Jones reported. "I am not afraid of the spoils system. It is gone," he added.

Former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Marion Folsom corroborated this by saying there was no political pressure on him about appointments. "Of course, those who are to fill these jobs have to be acceptable to the administration. . . . They naturally want people with the same objective as the party in power. That does not mean that it would be purely a political appointment."

Mr. Greenewalt questioned the emphasis on obtaining political executives, contracting out or obtaining temporary consultant guidance. "Frankly, I do not see how you can run this establishment of yours on the basis of borrowing that kind of people for 1, 2, 3, or 4 years from industry. I think you have got to look forward to developing a career echelon in Government that will, eventually, be able to supply the major part of the executive judgment that you need."

Not so, replied McKinsey and Company executive John Corson. ". . . They can only substitute for the political executive in the most limited sense. The latter remains the key source of administrative leadership, the Presidential representative with the responsibility for governing."

Other witnesses also recognized that the career man's bent and role are different from the political executive's. Jones accepted the fact that broad policy responsibilities had fallen on the career person and recognized that the turnover in political leadership had its good side in "an increasing dependence upon senior career people" which has given

"the career man a sense of responsibility and sets him in a framework which brings out the best . . .", but he warned that political executive turnover had gone too far and might cause career people either to avoid any policy commitment for fear of being out on a limb when executives change or to get careless and feel there is no point in "putting out, because the new bosses are not going to be here long enough. Either course leads them to appear inefficient and tempts them to provide continuity by simply filling the vacuum as inconspicuously as possible." Harold Boeschstein, President of Owens-Corning Fiberglas and several times in the government and adviser to it, saw career men as "extremely helpful as long as they do not have to stick their necks out and make decisions that could be controversial and thereby get themselves into trouble and impair their careers."

Though more than one witness agreed with Corson's evaluation of top career men as "able and too-little-appreciated," Corson and Jones both urged a program for broadening career people. Corson reported that most of them spend their whole career in one department and are not prepared for the complex problems to be solved at the top of any federal agency. He recommended planned rotations among departments. Jones pressed for education at the top, saying that staff agencies "have been thrilled—and I used that word advisedly—by the success" of the Brookings Institution Williamsburg conferences for 300 senior career people.

Major emphasis in the hearings was put on adjusting conflict of interest laws and on contracting out, subjects the *Review* will look at separately in later issues.

Municipal Manpower Study

The Municipal Manpower Commission started its work not so much because of concern for growing shortages of key personnel but rather due to predictions of sharply rising demands on municipalities following population increases, urbanization, and our rapidly changing way of life. Recognizing that there always is competition for capable top-level administrative generalists, administrative specialists, and technical specialists, the Commission hopes to sketch out a picture of what local government will be expected to do a

decade or so hence and the manpower in these categories that will be needed.

Much of the study will be contracted out. The Commission itself, headed by James E. Webb, former U. S. budget director and under secretary of state, and including business and university executives, several with federal government experience, will evaluate and seek support for the goals and conclusions. Research will cover such areas of urban government as the role of the administrator, current personnel problems, public attitudes toward government careers, feasibility of a central clearing house for urban government personnel, education needs for these positions, personnel techniques, and conditions of employment.

The Commission is sponsored by the American Municipal Association, the American Institute of Planners, and the American Society of Planning Officials and is financed by a \$500,000 Ford Foundation grant.

The Regulatory Process: A Defense and New Attack

Louis Hector's critique of independent regulatory procedures, issued in September as he resigned from the Civil Aeronautics Board (see 19 PAR 273 (Autumn, 1959)), was trumpeted in the *Saturday Evening Post*, *Business Week*, *Aviation Week*, and the *American Bar Association Journal*. Six months after Hector's blast, CAB replied. The first section was essentially an angry attack on Hector's proposals, written in the first person singular but attributed only to the CAB Office of General Counsel. The second part was a point by point reply.

One of Hector's main concerns was that policy is seldom made clear. The process of evolving policy case-by-case is not satisfactory, he argued.

First, those involved in litigated questions do not know what to expect. CAB's reply compares the judicial process to the quasi-judicial process in this regard. "Strictly speaking, in normal judicial processes the parties receive no help from the court, with respect to the criteria to be applied to their controversy. . . ." Other CAB remarks, however, make a clear distinction between what one expects from a court, with its fundamental reliance on previous decisions, and CAB conclusions:

"... a case may be decided one way in 1954, and another way in 1957. This is characteristic of multi-member agencies and in my judgment is a product of the compromise and interplay of the opinions of several different members resulting from persuasion, gradual changes in members of an agency, and the dynamic nature of air transportation with its rapidly changing conditions." Several additional allusions are made to the need for policy flexibility, though CAB asserts that "it is rare indeed that a shift in Board policy involves a completely new line of approach, which comes as a surprise to the parties."

Nevertheless, the only defense against Hector's accusation that a particular criterion was given sharply different weight in a series of decisions over a relatively brief span was that this criterion "is only one factor to be taken into consideration." The effects of changes in CAB policies may not be oppressive to parties, in any case, one argument implies. "Since most Board proceedings are either rule making or licensing proceedings looking to the prescription of rights or rules for the future, such proceedings lend themselves to formulation of policy on either a piecemeal or wholesale scale."

Hector saw two other disadvantages to formulation of policies case-by-case. 1. Examiners, who hear the evidence in the first place, have insufficient guidance in making recommendations—to which CAB replies that previous decisions offer sufficient guidance and that even when the Board reverses the examiner's recommendation, his work sets up the issues for Board decision and has not been wasted, as Hector had implied. 2. It is harder for the CAB, Congress, the industry and the public to see where we are going when policies are made as cases come up—to which CAB points out a large number of investigations and long-range policies made on the Board's initiative without reference to specific cases, though admitting at least in regard to route planning that "perhaps more could and should have been done in this respect" (but staff and facilities are limited and demands on the Board are "numerous, varied and complex . . .").

A second Hector criticism of adjudicatory practices was that Board members do not write their own decisions nor do they become personally familiar with the evidence heard

and sifted by the examiner. They can reject the examiner's view without explaining why, and they need never wrestle with the complexities of the case, leaving it to the opinion-writers to do so. CAB replies: (1) "the Board adopts the bulk of the examiner's findings . . . in the great preponderance of the cases coming before it," (2) the Board is sufficiently aware of the narrowly-defined areas where differences are likely, and (3) it reviews the decisions written by the opinion-writers. If members wrote their own decisions as judges do, "there might well be difficulty . . . in obtaining concurrence of the other members . . . in that the other members, while concurring in the result, nonetheless might not agree with the personal views and reasoning of the opinion-writing member. . . . An integrated opinion writing staff . . . by training and experience seeks to obtain a blending of individual views to obtain what is truly an opinion of 'the Board.' . . . Consistency in agency opinions is achieved through the avoidance of purely personal or individual views. . . ." (This may explain why Hector found it hard to discover clear policy statements in case-by-case opinions.)

(Recently the Supreme Court also has been criticized widely for failing to provide clear policy guidance through case-by-case decisions, raising problems for advocates of an administrative court.)

To Hector's proposals that an executive department be given CAB's policy-making responsibility, that special administrative courts handle adjudication, and that the Department of Justice possibly take over prosecution and investigation, CAB replies that it is almost impossible to separate quasi-legislative (policy-setting) and quasi-judicial responsibilities, that even where separation is possible, the same issues often would be argued twice, once before the executive agency—for example, on routes—and a second time before the administrative court—on which firm should fly them. The later decision often affects the earlier one. As to separating the prosecuting functions from promotional responsibilities, apparently to assure that the prosecutors would not overlook misdeeds in the interest of the industry, CAB claims it has a vigorous enforcement policy, that the Department of Justice has authority now to take up cases either before the Board or the courts,

that in at least one instance the Justice Department thought CAB was trying to be too hard on a malefactor, and that surely the Department would check with the agency responsible for promoting the industry before prosecuting anyhow.

As to Hector's complaint about lack of policy coordination with other federal agencies, CAB claims it does a good deal of this, but "we think it would be a serious mistake to submerge the interests and needs of air transportation development with a multi-minded executive department. . . ." Furthermore, coordination takes time: "the pulling and tugging between various departments and agencies within the executive establishment . . . delays . . . decisions."

To many criticisms, CAB replies—that's the way Congress wants it. To criticism generally, the reply makes much of the success of the air transport industry and the repeated statements of support of the industry and Congress for independent regulatory agencies. Finally, CAB claims, there are inherent advantages in multi-headed commissions: fewer radical policy shifts, less danger that operations will deteriorate due to the appointment of a bad administrator, less danger of "arbitrary or unwise action. . . ." ("Comments of the Civil Aeronautics Board on the Hector Memorandum to the President.")

The Senate Begins a Study

As most newspaper readers are aware, a House subcommittee has been investigating regulatory commissions and agencies for several years. Last year, a new Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure began a much quieter study—the Senate's first on the subject since the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act. Before it are American Bar Association bills to prohibit any off-the-record written or oral communication to a federal agency related to a decision which legally must be made on the basis of a hearing on record. This includes many rule-making decisions as well as quasi-judicial decisions. Another ABA bill would establish an independent Office of Federal Administrative Practice to study procedures of regulatory agencies, advise them at their request, investigate complaints about them, and recommend uniform practices where feasible.

Though recent hearings of the House Legislative Oversight Subcommittee have headlined the large number of personal conversations between Federal Power Commission members and representatives of firms with cases pending before them, the FPC chairman, along with the other regulatory agency spokesmen before the Senate Subcommittee, denied that they were influenced by *ex parte* communications. The FPC chairman admitted to the Subcommittee that he often discussed pending cases with participants but insisted that the effect of off-the-record efforts to influence FPC decisions was "almost nil" and that he never had trouble stopping the conversation when it turned to substantive as opposed to procedural matters. (However, one FPC member felt justified in holding frequent *ex parte* discussions of contested petitions to consolidate or sever combined cases because they were procedural.) (Anthony Lewis, "264 Private Talks on Gas Cases Laid to F.P.C. Member," *New York Times*, May 14, 1960.)

From the other side of the fence, Senator Dirksen saw *ex parte* representations this way:

Ever since 1933, when I came here as a freshman Congressman, I have been calling every agency in Government in the interest of my constituents. . . . Now let's get the specific examples. There is an airline . . . based in Chicago. I know the president and all the personnel and a good many of the pilots. There is another airline based in Missouri. . . . I don't know very much about it. But there is . . . an application pending before CAB, and they both want to be certified for a stop in Iowa, so I call up the Chairman of the CAB and I say: "Look, Mr. —, X Airlines has an application pending. I know these people, they are good, reliable operators; they are good solid citizens. I just want to know what the status of the matter is." . . . An attorney comes in. . . . He says: "Look, we want that television station. You have friends down there, haven't you? Call them up and see whether you can't do us some good. Make some inquiry; get some hint of how soon it is going to be decided, how it will be disposed of; get as much information as you can." [If I refuse,] he will probably say: "Well, what kind of a friend are you, anyway? Don't you look after your constituents? . . . I don't know those fellows; I don't even know where the office is." . . . If this law is on the books, I have to . . . say . . . "Can I do this or does the law say I may go to jail?" But they are my people. . . . And they can't find their way around in Washington. The Federal Register is enormous now and the records

on administrative decisions would fill this room. That is a baffling, bewildering thing for the people to confront. Now . . . just look at the practical aspects of the matter: Here is a Commission and one of the members . . . comes from Illinois. What would be the natural thing to do? Call up the clerk? Why certainly not. You would call up the person in the Commission that you know in order to get information. . . . I may know the hearing examiner, I may know a member on the staff. . . . Of course after you have been on the ground here a long time you grow up with people. When you go to a cocktail party, you may see a member of a commission. . . . You know him by his first name. You know something about his family. What is the natural thing to do? You say: "I will call up Joe Doak, I know him, I have seen him, I know all about him." It does not mean you have any particular influence, but that is the fellow that you would call.

To these remarks, other senators and witnesses replied: Each agency should have a central information office through which anyone can find out the status of cases without talking to the persons who will decide the pending case; any statement a senator wishes to make about a party to a case can be made on the record; if this type of law were passed, attitudes would change and eventually parties to cases would no more think of asking intervention with an administrative tribunal than with a court; and the proposed Office of Federal Administrative Practice could take up in a neutral way any complaint about treatment of a party by an agency.

Though all witnesses agreed that certain kinds of regulatory agency decisions should be made on the record only and that written or oral comments from most persons should not only appear in the record but should be submitted to all interested parties, nearly all disagreed with one or another important part of the bill to accomplish this purpose. Regulatory agency spokesmen were nearly unanimous in insisting that some of the matters that would be covered by the bill should not be included.

The main difficulty lay in defining rule-making procedures to include in the bill's scope cases in which private parties had substantial interests—particularly those allocating valuable rights, such as television channels and airline routes—without preventing an agency from getting information informally

from all possible sources on matters which do not importantly affect individual rights. (Indeed, one of Hector's criticisms was that CAB used clumsy, formal hearing procedures when informal research would be more appropriate.)

Witnesses also disagreed on whether commissioners should discuss pending cases off-the-record with their own staffs. One senator contended that since there were legitimate disagreements among experts, parties should have a right to reply to any expert views used in the decision, whether they came from the agency's own staff or outsiders. Most agency spokesmen felt it would unjustifiably cripple their work to prevent them from talking to their own technical staffs. The Federal Trade Commission, however, does not now allow any off-the-record communication on a pending case except from legal advisers.

Several commission spokesmen emphasized that greater speed and efficiency in handling pending matters would cut down the opportunity as well as the inclination to use influence; one even berated the Subcommittee for concentrating on these bills when the real question was how to get more decisions out and assure the protection of the public interest rather than creating more procedural rules for litigants to use in avoiding control.

Differences among the responsibilities of regulatory agencies were emphasized, particularly in opposition to a central agency which could recommend uniform practices. Though several witnesses saw a need for prodding from the outside to improve regulatory machinery, most agency representatives denounced any outside effort to change procedures—some because their responsibilities differed from other agencies', some because nothing should stand between the regulatory agency and the Congress to which they are responsible. ("Administrative Procedure Legislation," Hearings before a Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee (1960).)

The Subcommittee Report

Senators Hruska and Wiley joined Dirksen in a minority report likening a congressman's *ex parte* communication with a regulatory agency to a clergyman's character testimony in court. ". . . It is human nature to use as the advocates of one's position or as witnesses

in favor of one's position men who are highly regarded by the tribunal. . . . I don't think we carry any special weight, but if we do, it is our duty to help our constituents. . . . It is true, too, we are likely to get a quicker answer when we inquire as to the status of an administrative proceeding, and such inquiry, too, is part of our jobs on behalf of our constituents." Interference with this would be "harmful" to the country.

The three senators also protested the majority's assertion that the system of administrative law is in "serious disrepute."

In a separate minority report, Senator Keating took an opposite view. We should ask an outside committee to recommend legislation, he proposed. "I have a strong feeling that an objective observer would be likely to discover a degree of congressional responsibility for the plight of the administrative agencies which Congressmen may not as readily discern."

The Subcommittee majority reported that its staff was working on a revision of the bill governing *ex parte* communications in order to meet witnesses objections, particularly because the bill relied too heavily on criminal sanctions. More fundamental administrative law bills are to be considered further by the Subcommittee. (Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, "Administrative Practice and Procedure," May 25, 1960.)

Other Arguments and Suggestions

The regulated, too, were chary of change. The New York Chamber of Commerce issued a report based on a two-year study warning against "the enactment of drastic legislation which would unduly 'judicialize' the commissions or preclude proper informal contacts between the regulators and the regulated, which can contribute greatly to the understanding by each of the problems of the other, to the avoidance of unnecessary delays, and thus to the public interest in wise and effective regulation." The study did object to staff members presenting a case against a firm and then advising the commission on the decision, however. High turnover of commissioners due to adverse conditions in public office and a short-run rather than long-run view of consumer self-interest based on the false idea that lower profits mean lower prices were identified as major evils. ("Regulative

Units Hit in Study Here," *New York Times*, May 2, 1960.)

Public Corporations—Embroiled Giants?

The public corporation, established to move out of the political arena operations on which ostensibly the major policy decisions already have been made, is back in the news for not being politically responsive (in this country) and being politically responsive in the wrong way (in India).

The Port of New York Authority, even in the view of a recent sharp critic, has undisputed integrity and accomplishments and "... on its own terms ... is doing a grand job." (Edward T. Chase, "How to Rescue New York from Its Port Authority," 220 *Harper's Magazine* 67 (June, 1960).) Yet the *New York Times* recently described it as an "Embroiled Giant." While much of the criticism apparently started with the Port's proposal to build a large airport in New Jersey—to the residents' horror—some critics have entered a general indictment of its policy independence and particularly its part in encouraging an increasing number of cars into Manhattan while essential commuter railroads and necessary traffic flow are faltering. The Port, Chase claims, has fulfilled well its original aims but has failed to change its objectives to meet current needs, even though it has the power to do so.

But, as the *Times* remarked, "that belief in some quarters that the agency operates as an unchecked autonomous unit is not due to the absence of legislative restraints." The New York and New Jersey governors can veto any item in the board minutes and the state legislatures receive annual reports. (Douglas Dales, "Port Authority: Embroiled Giant," February 21, 1960.) Chase acknowledged that the governors and legislatures and the Congress, which also has powers over the interstate compact, "have also shirked responsibility." But because of the Port Authority's "massive" successes and also massive public relations (\$226,000 worth a year, according to Chase), "few politicians have dared tangle with the PA" until now, he added.

The House Judiciary Committee has begun to investigate it and even has issued subpoenas for records and the chairman has filed a bill to require congressional approval of amend-

ments to the interstate compact establishing it. (The Regional Plan Association has protested federal interference in a regional affair, a violation of a kind of home rule, RPA felt, and praised the Port for operating "responsibly and effectively in meeting rapidly changing needs of this region.") At the same time, the *New York Post* is in court trying to prove its right to see another public corporation's records, the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority. The issue hinges on whether the Authority can maintain business records in secret as a private corporation or is a public body and so subject to public scrutiny. (Russell Porter, "Post Presses Suit for Agency Data," *New York Times*, June 3, 1960.)

The alleged autonomy of local public corporations appears to contrast with that of federal corporations. Eight years ago, Harold Seidman wrote in this *Review* (apparently referring only to federal units) that the theory of autonomy of public corporations not only was on the wane but never really was practiced; that the President "cannot, even if he so desires, relieve himself of responsibility for the activities of government corporations"; that the Supreme Court has declared that a corporation, despite its title, is simply "an agency selected by the government to accomplish purely governmental purposes." He also noted that the idea of autonomy for public corporations "has taken hold principally in those countries in which the central government is weak or unstable, or in which there is deep-seated distrust of government." (Perhaps this applies, too, where there is no general government at all, as with corporations covering special districts.) ("The Theory of the Autonomous Government Corporation: A Critical Appraisal," 12 *PAR* 89-90 (Spring, 1952).)

Related Problems Abroad

In England, policy guidance of public corporations is legally required of the appropriate minister, but "Ministers do not use their statutory powers which entail responsibility to the Parliament but take advantage of the existence of these powers to influence the board and this is supposed to be considerable." Likewise, "all who have knowledge and experience of this matter in India have no doubt that Ministerial control is too close and is exercised in a similar way." ". . . Neither

in England nor in India is there any satisfaction over the effectiveness of parliamentary control." (Amba Prasad, "The Theory and Practice of the Public Corporation in a Democracy," 6 *Indian Journal of Public Administration* 27-51 (January-March, 1960).) A recent scandal in which, the investigation commission found, the principal secretary of the Finance Department influenced the Indian Life Insurance Corporation to purchase stock from an unsavory character at "indefensibly high prices" with the justification that it was stabilizing the stock exchange illustrates an evil effect of informal policy guidance by the government.

Setting Policies in Advance

To increase popular control over public corporation policies without damaging initiative on managerial questions, we can and should develop criteria by which to judge corporation activities, an Indian student of both British and Indian corporations insists. Though "admittedly it is not possible to classify every issue as a purely commercial one or as a potential matter of policy," clearer policy guides can be established, he demonstrates, using the case of British electricity. In addition to increased public control, clearer policy guidance will encourage able managers to serve on public corporations. They have hesitated because the boards have not been sufficiently "insulated from liability to criticism on grounds of social policy." (V. V. Ramanadham, *Problems of Public Enterprise*, Quadrangle Books, 1960.) Somewhat similarly, Mr. Chase calls for an order to the Port of New York Authority to take over and comprehensively plan the whole New York metropolitan area transportation system and to operate henceforth under the guidance of a governmental planning agency.

(Note the similarity to Hector's solution to regulatory commission problems, above.)

Collective Bargaining in the Public Service

"More and more civil servants are organizing their own associations, and those already in existence are growing," the National Civil Service League reported in the March *Good Government*. NCSL estimates that independent state organizations have more than 300,000 members, and the AFL-CIO American

Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees has 200,000. "Increasingly," NCSL continues, "organized employees are seeking to transfer to the public service labor relations practices of private industry, including collective bargaining, check-off of union dues, and, in extreme cases, the strike."

Philadelphia this summer became the first large U. S. city to sign a union shop agreement with a union. All employees in 188 job classifications—12,000 at present—eventually will be required to join the union. Incumbents will not be forced to join; new personnel will. Two weeks each year, anyone may withdraw. About 10,500 of the 12,000 are already union members. Another 4,800 employees may belong to a union but need not; 1,200 high-level supervisors may not belong. City managing director Donald C. Wagner called the contract "stabilizing" and noted that it will result in spreading support for the union which now "renders significant services" to nonmembers.

The idea of collective bargaining in government "now has considerable acceptance," a veteran federal personnel and industrial rela-

tions man observes in the July, 1960 *Public Personnel Review*. Five state legislatures liberalized "union recognition or disputes settlement provisions" in 1959; one state tightened restrictions, according to Oscar S. Smith, Director of Industrial Relations for the Atomic Energy Commission.

Smith feels that union-management negotiation "can offer important values in public employment" through "participation in the determination of conditions of employment by the persons directly involved" and their assumption of responsibility for agreement on these conditions.

However, because strikes are not allowed, Smith sees a need for some other incentive to agree. The cost of strikes to both sides motivates industry and its labor force to agree, he notes.

Neither arbitration nor lobbying by employee groups are satisfactory substitutes for negotiation, Mr. Smith argues, because they do not "provide the parties with the satisfaction of creating their own relationship by the agreement process."

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
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